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ABSTRACT
Capitalism and Violence: A Test and Critique 
of the Alienation Proposition
by
Roger Roots
Dr. Frederick W. Preston, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f Sociology 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
The belief that primitive societies are more harmonious than modem ones is 
“deeply engrained in scholarly discourse” (Edgerton 1992, 2). Durkheim, Weber, and 
Marx all believed in the notion (Edgerton 1992, 3). Since at least the nineteenth 
century, social scientists have proposed that capitalism and industrialism represent 
artificial phenomena, alien to human nature, and that the growth and spread of 
capitalism in recent generations has spawned an increasing degree of angst, frustration, 
conflict, and stress on human societies. This concept, known as alienation, has been 
especially popular among sociologists of Marxist orientation who perceive human 
misery to be a product o f the mayhem and competition of modem capitalism (Derber, 
Chasin). In this dissertation, the author critiques and analyzes the alienation proposition 
by delving into its history and comparing it to the recent findings of archaeology, 
history, and anthropology. The author tests the proposition by comparing contemporary
111
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
homicide rates registered by modem nation-states with measurements of market 
freedom in those same nation-states.
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CHAPTER 1
A TROUBLESOME WORD 
“Capitalism” has been the subject of so much discussion in Western discourse 
that it should lend itself to easy definition. Yet rival theoretical camps within the social 
sciences attribute different meanings to the term (Laga 2004). Competing conceptions 
of capitalism are central elements of a number of grand sociological theories. It seems 
to say something about capitalism itself that its invocation in language provokes such 
disagreement. To use the term is to give voice to one perspective o f human economic 
history at the expense of others (Phillips 2001, 56). Most importantly, users o f the term 
capitalism have profoundly different answers to the ultimate question of whether it 
signifies human economic nature or an imposition upon human nature. And, ultimately, 
these rival interpretations determine whether its users view capitalism as a 
manifestation o f economic freedom or economic slavery (compare Blyth (2004) and 
Hejeebu and McCloskey (2004)).
Early works about capitalism, like Adam Smith’s Wealth o f  Nations (1776) did 
not attach such moral significance to the concept. In fact, the term was not widely used 
until the nineteenth century (Wrong 2004, 26), and it was not until the twentieth century 
“that it fully burst upon political debate” -and then largely in a peijorative sense 
(Braudel 1982, 237).' The publication o f two major theoretical works, Karl Marx’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Capital (1894) and Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism 
(1905) can be blamed for producing the wealth of conceptual power that we now 
attribute to the word. Both works invited readers to look beyond the appearances of 
existing economic structures and into their historical and social development. Each 
invested hundreds o f pages into constructing a meaning of capitalism consistent with 
the theories o f its author. The word never afterward lent itself to simplistic definition.
Although Weber and Marx differed markedly over many things, their depiction 
of capitalism as an artificial creation rather than a natural oeeurrence became accepted 
as sociological law by the 1930s. Weber and Marx looked hard for, and consequently 
found, “proof’ of capitalism’s uniqueness. They conceded the ubiquity of markets of 
goods in antiquity and across all organized societies but insisted that there were 
important distinctions between these markets and capitalism. They defined their 
versions of capitalism with such precision that only their specialized realm of 
concentration (Europe in the late middle ages to the industrial era) qualified as having 
it.
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism (1930), Weber laid out an 
elaborate interpretation of modem western economic history that painted contemporary 
capitalism as the unique product of specific phenomena in medieval and renaissance 
Europe. “Only in the Occident,” wrote Weber in the memorable introduction, do 
economic circumstances gel into authentic capitalism.
It was rationalism—the calm, systematic, machinelike gathering of profits from 
industry and commerce—that, for Weber, was the keystone. True capitalism, according 
to Weber, was “the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit (Weber 1983, 24).
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“Where capitalistic acquisition is rationally pursued, calculation underlies every single 
action of the [commercial] partners” (p. 24). Weber argued that modem westem society 
(“the Occident”) “has developed capitalism both to a quantitative extent and in types, 
forms and directions which have never existed elsewhere’" (p. 25, emphasis added). 
“[A]ll characteristic legal institutions o f modem capitalism,” wrote Weber from 
corporations, to negotiable securities, to bills o f exchange, to stock certificates, to 
mortgages, to deeds o f tmst were inventions o f modem Europe (26, 118). Weber 
believed there were no factories prior to the Middle Ages, only slave-labor operations 
directed by state officials (1983, 44).
Marxist and Weberian theorists suggested that the definition of capitalism can 
require as many as a half-dozen specific elements (Wrong 2004). Weber himself 
defined capitalism as a system in which 1) the appropriation of means of production are 
in private hands 2) there are free markets, 3) there is mechanization of production, 4) 
predictable law goveming business affairs, 5) free labor, and 6) a ’’commercialization of 
economic life”—meaning a robust culture of commercial (i.e., banking and financing) 
instmments (Weber 1999, 44). “While capitalism of various forms is met with in all 
periods of history,” wrote Weber, “the stmcturing o f social life around capitalistic 
methods is characteristic of the Occident alone and even here has been the inevitable 
method only since the middle o f the nineteenth century” (Weber 1999, 43-44).
Weber distinguished this natural tendency toward profitable market exchange from 
capitalism as follows:
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The impulse to acquisition, pursuit o f gain, of money, o f the greatest 
possible amount o f money, has in itself nothing to do with capitalism.
This impulse exists and has existed among waiters, physicians, 
coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishonest officials, soldiers, nobles, 
crusaders, gamblers and beggars. One may say that it has been 
common to all sorts and conditions of men at all times and in all 
countries o f the world, wherever the objective possibility o f it has been 
given.. .  Unlimited greed for gain is not in the least identical with 
capitalism, and is still less its spirit (Weber 1983, 24).
This view of eapitalism as a new, artifieial, westem invention has prevailed in 
sociology for a century. Gordon Marshall’s Oxford Dictionary o f  Sociology (1998, 53), 
for example, contains an eight-paragraph definition, beginning with “a system of wage- 
labour and commodity production for sale, exchange, and profit, rather than for 
immediate need of the producers.”
Yet rival, less complieated views of the concept have endured since the days of 
Adam Smith (Wrong 2004). Smith thought that laissez-fare economics were most 
consistent with man’s propensity to “track, barter and exehange” (1776, 13). “Every 
man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant,” wrote Smith, 
“and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society” (Smith 1776, 
29). Smith found that societies funetion most smoothly when the “invisible hand” is 
unfettered and free to distribute goods and services in accordance with private demand.^ 
Thomas Sowell, an economist of the neo-liberal tradition, echoed Smith’s view: “Since
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
capitalism was named by its enemies, it is perhaps not surprising that the name is 
completely misleading,” wrote Sowell (1995, 207). “Ultimately it is nothing more and 
nothing less than an economy not run by political authorities” (207).
Sowell’s seemingly simple definition is loaded with unstated assumptions. It 
assumes that capitalism is the natural economic state o f humanity and that impositions 
by political authorities are artificial insurgents against human nature. Sowell’s 
definition also assumes that capitalism is the natural eeonomic system of all societies.^
Critics of Adam Smith like economic historian Karl Polanyi, suggested that 
primitive nonwestem societies uncorrepted by contact with the West operate on a basis 
of collective economic distribution. Primitive natives, aecording to Polanyi do nothing 
at all for personal “gain”; only for “reciprocity” or ritualized “magie.” Markets, 
aceording to this view, “became important only in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries (Silver 1983, 796). Prior to that there were “redistributive empires over long 
periods of time” (Polanyi 1977, 115). “[S]ocial solidarity was accomplished through 
the declaration of ‘equivalencies’ by the state—that is, by pervasive controls over 
prices, wages, rent, and interest” (Silver 1983, 827). Market eeonomies were “new 
phenomena, never witnessed before” (Silver 1983, 827 quoting Polanyi, liii, 6).
Polanyi’s most widely read book. The Great Transformation, ranks along with Karl 
Marx’s Capital, and Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic as one o f the most eommonly 
read and highly regarded works o f economic history. It “borrows haphazardly from 
economics, sociology, anthropology, and history” (Blyth 2004, 117).
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Capitalism as a Westem Phenomenon 
Marx and Weber defined capitalism in part by marrying it to the 
industrial revolution, and consequently placing it only in the modem world, and 
primarily in the west."* Even if  versions of free market eeonomies existed in 
other cultures—or had existed in pre-industrial Europe—these economic 
variations did not gel into the all-encompassing form of capitalism that came 
with the Enlightenment and the Protestant Reformation. Nor, aceording to 
Noam Chomsky (1993), were non western forms o f market eeonomies as cold 
and bmtal as the Westem form. Europeans “broke violently into Asian trading 
systems that had been relatively peaeeful before their arrival” (Chomsky 1993, 8 
(quoting James Tracy)). Other scholars have suggested that no authentic 
nonwestem form of ffee-market capitalism ever really existed, and that where 
modem nonwestem ffee-market cultures exist, they had it imposed on them by 
westem nations (Rosenau 2003, 3).
Alienation
The questions posed by these rival definitions o f eapitalism are more than academic. 
Those who subscribe to the Marxist or Weberian view advocate interventionist 
economic policies, while those who view capitalism as humanity’s natural state 
generally hold more politically libertarian views. Moreover, those who view capitalism 
as an artificial phenomenon suggest that it dismpts something intrinsic to human social 
wellbeing. Marx and those who followed him had a word for the human condition that 
capitalism generated: alienation. Alienation, according to Marx, occurred when
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
workers were separated from control over production and from the fruits of their labor. 
“[B]y selling one’s labor, the laborer becomes a commodity herself, a kind o f product 
that is owned and consumed by the owner” (Laga 2004, 2). Alienation was akin to 
Durkheim’s anomie, a state of disharmony and tension with nature brought about by 
social (and economic) instability. Marx wrote that capitalism generated “conquest, 
enslavement, robbery, murder” among societies that suffered from it (1990, ch. 26). 
Thus the history o f capitalism, according to Marx, was “written in the annals of 
mankind in letters of blood and fire” (ch. 26).
For the Smithians and neoliberals, in contrast, “capitalism” represents harmony 
with nature, and anomie is more likely to occur when the capitalistic instinct is 
suppressed by regulation. Advocates of both these views have different assessments of 
contemporary political economy and the proper role o f public policy. For generations, 
policymakers have battled over these concepts, occasionally implementing one 
application or another but never resolving social policy in any one direction.
Sigmund Freud, in his Civilization and Its Discontents (1961, 70-71), summed 
up the alienation theory of social conflict as well as any writer:
The communists believe that they have found the path to deliverance 
from our evils. According to them, man is wholly good and is well- 
disposed to his neighbour; but the institution of private property has 
corrupted his nature. The ownership of private wealth gives the 
individual power, and with it the temptation to ill-treat his neighbor; 
while man who is excluded from possession is bound to rebel in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
hostility against his oppressor. If private property were abolished, all 
wealth held in common, and everyone allowed to share in the 
enjoyment of it, ill-will and hostility would disappear among men.
Since everyone’s needs would be satisfied, no one would have any 
reason to regard another his enemy; all would willingly undertake the 
work that was necessary (70-71).^
According to Marx’s friend and frequent eo-author Frederick Engels, in his The Origin 
o f the Family, Private Property, and the State (1972 [1884]), “[T]he developing money 
system penetrated like a corroding acid into the traditional life o f the rural communities 
founded on natural economy” (111). And with private ownership of property, 
aceording to Engels, came the inequities of class structure:
The lowest interests—base greed, brutal sensuality, sordid avarice, 
selfish plunder of common possessions—usher in the new, civilized 
society, class society; the most outrageous means—theft, rape, deceit 
and treachery—undermine and topple the old, classless, gentile society.
And the new society, during all the 2,500 years o f its existence, has 
never been anything but the development of the small minority at the 
expense of the exploited and oppressed great majority; and it is so 
today more than ever before (Engels 1972, 101).
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Defining Alienation
In the broadest sense, alienation can be defined as the estrangement of 
individuals from one another, or from a specific situation or process (Marshall 1998). 
Many distinct philosophical, sociological, and psychological dimensions are invoked 
with the alienation concept, and not all of them find agreement with each other. 
Sociological discussions o f the concept relate most to Marx’s argument that certain 
social structures oppress people and deny their essential humanity (Marshall 1998). 
“Alienation is an objective condition inherent in the social and economic arrangements 
of capitalism” (p. 14).
The concept of alienation has been discussed and debated extensively since the 
nineteenth century. Marx suggested that capitalist production economies alienated 
workers by reducing them to the level o f commodities in which their range of choices 
were limited and their relationships with their work and their families and coworkers 
became strained (Marx 1944). Others view alienation as essentially a state o f mind (Cox 
1998). Defining alienation precisely is not easy “since the term has been used to 
describe a wide range of human experiences” (Smith and Preston 1977, 331). In 
general, however, the concept is defined as the whole variety of symptoms of 
estrangement that modem humans face in capitalist eeonomies, including the sense of 
meaninglessness, powerlessness, isolation, and normlessness associated with wages and 
occupational specialization (Seeman 1959). But while differences in interpretation exist 
in contemporary scholarly discourse, the concept of alienation encompasses a broad 
understanding as “shorthand for the mood of distemper, cynicism, and distrust believed 
to prevail in contemporary life” (Wrong 1998, 47).
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These various facets o f the same general concept can be operationalized by 
means of measurements o f social disharmony and frustration. Measurements such as 
rates of mental illness, rates o f domestic violence, levels of aggression, or other 
measures of violence generally are perhaps the clearest way to assign values to the 
concept in the real world. The quantitative analysis employed in this study relies on 
homicide rates as its chief means o f operationalizing the concept.
A Tendency to Crisis?
Consistent with their view that capitalism generates alienation and anomie 
among societies that have adopted it, the alienationists also propose that capitalism is on 
a trajectory toward crisis (Wood 1999, 1). The contemporary alienation model posits 
that “[gjlobalized eapitalism has changed the face of social reproduction worldwide 
over the past three decades, enabling intensification of capital accumulation and 
exacerbating differences in wealth and poverty” (Katz 2003, 256). The current stage, a 
hypercapitalist or critical stage in capitalism, represents, according to Katz, represents a 
“demise o f the social contract” (2003, 256). Although capitalism may survive for “a 
few centuries yet,” its ultimate overthrow by soeialism is predestined (Marcuse 1978, 
178).
The concept of alienation assumes that people trapped in capitalist societies 
exhibit tendencies toward a wide variety o f anti-social disorders. Violence increases 
beeause competition for “scarce resourees, property, and territory as well as for self­
esteem and self respect encourages greed, envy, jealousy, deeeit, betrayal, and 
exploitation” (Rosenau 2003, 47). In the absence of an alternate morality, capitalism
10
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“generates a self-reinforcing spiral o f intensifying competition” (Rosenau 2003, 47). 
“Evidence o f the resulting social stress is everywhere,” according to proponents o f the 
alienation proposition: “in rising rates of crime, drug abuse, divorce, teenage suicide, 
and domestic violence; growing numbers of political, economic, and environmental 
refugees; and even the changing nature o f organized armed conflict. Violent crime is 
increasing at alarming rates all around the world” (Kortner 1995, 30).
Moreover, according to the alienationists, these tensions are increasing 
as capitalism is spread through the world by westem hegemony. Fueled by 
alienation, commodity fetishism, and greed, westerners set out in the eighteenth 
century upon a mission for global domination, according to the Marxists and 
Weberians. The ideology they carried with them fueled a brutal imperialism 
that conquered all in its path. “Europeans ‘fought to kill,’ and they had the 
means to satisfy their blood lust,” according to Chomsky (1993, 8). Imperial 
conquest o f other continents was typified by savagery and “all-destmctive fury.”
The European model of mercantilism “relied critically upon the constant use of 
force” (Chomsky 1993, 8).
11
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CHAPTER 2
THE LITERATURE 
The relationship between economic change and social behavior is a frequently 
revisited topic of sociological research (Catalano and Dooley 1977; Cottrell 1951; 
Burgess 1925; Ogbum 1936). The most famous classical study o f this relationship is 
Durkheim’s (1897) study of suicide rates in Europe in the early 1890s, which found a 
relationship between suicide rates and eeonomic fluctuation. Durkheim’s eeonomic 
analysis of social behavior has since been emulated and largely substantiated by more 
contemporary sociologists (e.g., Pieree 1967). Pierce found that economic fluctuation, 
whether in positive or negative directions, reduces social cohesion and leads to 
increased frequency of suicide. Brenner (1973) also found a relationship between 
economic change and deviant behavior, as measured by first admissions to New York 
State mental hospitals.
Barbara Chasin, in her book-length study of the question. Inequality and 
Violence in the United States (1997), subtitled Casualties o f Capitalism, attributes rates 
of violence solely to economic structure. She suggests that even institutions like the 
modem nuclear family are extensions o f the capitalist stmcture o f the west, and 
violence tends to follow the money, so to speak. The westem capitalist nations, 
according to Chasin, are the chief promoters of violence in the world, led by their 
capitalist flagship, the United States. “Much o f the violence in the United States is
12
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linked to the decisions of those in the economic and political command posts with 
corporate bureaucracies being the most powerful in the United States” (22).
While Chasin’s thesis seems simple at first glance, it soon gains layers o f 
complexity as it is analyzed. Chasin attributes the violence o f both the powerless and 
the powerful to the same underlying cause: capitalism. Violence by the poor against 
the rieh, she said, is caused by the hatreds and jealousies that come with lower 
socioeconomic status. Violence by the poor against other poor, likewise, is attributable 
to the angst of their powerlessness and their mad competition between each other to rise 
through the social structure. Violence by the powerful against the powerless-. Again, the 
competition that drives capitalist economic systems. Even violence by the powerful 
against the powerful is explained as a product of jealousy. Thus, violence is the 
undergirder o f the the entire modem world order: “a distinct violence of powerlessness 
as well as a violence o f domination” (Gautney 2003, 78).
Few scholars have offered a precise explanation of how capitalism generates 
violence. Pauline V. Rosenau, however, has attempted to define the metabological and 
psychological stresses that link open markets to social conflict. Competition 
“encourages greed, envy, jealousy, deceit, betrayal, and exploitation” and removes 
inhibitions o f hostility and aggression (Rosenau 2003, 47). “Rosenau points to links 
between stress and hypertention, heart disease, diabetes, depression and reduced 
immunity (21). Consequently, health stresses are very high for those at bottom of social 
structure (Rosenu 26).
Boston College sociologist Charles Derber (2002) refers to the violence 
generated by America’s market economy as the “Wilding of America” and attributes the
13
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high homicide rates in the contemporary U. S. to greed and competition over the 
“American Dream.” “America now faces a wilding epidemic that is eating at the 
country’s social foundation and could rot it,” Derber proclaims:
Wilding includes a vast spectrum of self-centered and self- 
aggrandizing behavior that harms others. A wilding epidemic tears at 
the social fabric and threatens to unravel society itself, ultimately 
reflecting the erosion o f the moral order and the withdrawal o f feelings 
and commitments from others to oneself, “number one” (Derber 2002,
8).
The only solution, according to Derber, is to erect massive institutions of social 
welfare and wealth redistribution. Like many proponents of the alienation thesis, 
Derber sees collective intervention in the economy as an effective means of stemming 
the tide of global violence.
Derber’s thesis travels through his descriptions o f increasing road rage, 
workplace rage, school rage, and air rage, corporate corruption, family violence and 
even college cheating scandals. “Expressive and instrumental wilding have in common 
an anti-social self-centeredness made possible by a stunning collapse of moral restraints 
and a chilling lack of empathy” (p. 9).
The economic implications o f Derber’s thesis are unmistakable. “Systematic 
connections exist,” said Derber, “between American capitalism and wilding” (p. 12). 
“The progress o f the wilding epidemic is shaped less by the percentage of sociopaths in
14
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the population than by the sociopathy of elites and the rules of the success game they 
help to define. . . .  The wilding epidemic is now seeping into America mainly from the 
top” (p. 14);
Our current wilding crisis is rooted politically in the “ffee-market” 
revolution that began with President Reagan. As conservative analyst 
Kevin Phillips has noted, the Reagan revolution advanced the most 
ambitious class agenda o f the rich in more than a century, creating an 
innovative brew of market deregulation and individualistic ideology 
that helped fan the flames of wilding across the land. In the 1990s, a 
new Republican congressional majority led by Speaker Newt Gingrich 
and the “new Democrats” led by President Clinton launched their own 
wilding initiatives and raced against each other to dismantle the social 
programs that symbolize our commitment to the poor, to the needy, and 
to each other. And in 2001, President George W. Bush, despite his 
rhetoric of compassionate conservatism, promised to complete the 
revolution of greed that Reagan hegan (Derber 2002, 14).
Globalization
During the past decade, much sociological commentary has revolved around 
globalization and its effects on the Third World. Those who subscribe to the alienation 
thesis have suggested that globalization—the increasing movement o f capital, goods.
15
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businesses, culture, and people across national borders—has been a bane to the 
sociological health o f the world. Scholars have drawn disparate conclusions, with 
some proclaiming lasting benefits to workers in opening Asian markets (Norberg 2003; 
Sowell 2004) and others seeing a downturn in the opportunities and lifestyles of the 
world’s poor (Korten 1995; Gautney 2002; Chomsky 2003). The alienation model has 
been revived to explain and predict the social features of the phenomenon. “[W]e see 
that the growing violence and the extraction of wealth from apparently independent 
states are an integral component o f contemporary globalization,” wrote Schiller and 
Fouron, both die-hard alienation theorists (2003, 237). Robert W. McChesney (1999:8) 
claimed that capitalist reforms have brought terrible consequences to the global 
community: “a massive increase in social and economic inequality, a marked increase 
in severe deprivation for the poorest nations and peoples of the world, a disastrous 
global environment, an unstable global economy and an unprecedented bonanza for the 
wealthy.”
Noam Chomsky, in Hegemony or Survival (2003) claimed that the growth of 
global markets has allowed the most powerful state in world history to maintain its 
global domination through military force. Postmodern critical theorist Frederic Jameson 
indicated that expanding free markets represent a “new wave of American military and 
economic domination throughout the world: in this sense, as throughout class history, 
the underside o f culture is blood, torture, death and horror” (1993, 65). Globalization 
“creates intense competition between the more powerful and weaker numbers of the 
crew for a shrinking pool of life-support services,” wrote Korten in his provocative 
book When Corporations Rule the World (1995). “Some crew members are deprived of
16
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a means of basic sustenance, social tensions mount, and the legitimacy o f governance 
structures erodes— creating significant potential for social breakdown and violence” 
(Korten 1995: 26).
Amy Chua’s recent academic best-seller World on Fire (2004) suggests that 
global free markets have tended to benefit insular mercantilist minorities around the 
globe: Jews in post-Communist Russia, Indians in East Africa, Tutsis in Rwanda, 
Hungarians in Romania, Chinese in southeast Asia, and whites in Latin America and 
Zimbabwe—at the expense of population majorities. A “pigmentocracy” has developed 
in Latin America (Chua 2004: 57), typified by dark-skinned poverty and light-skinned 
plutocracy (59). This wealth disparity between majorities and minorities, according to 
Chua, generates demagoguery and ultimately ethnic violence as a backlash. “Thus 
glohalization and free markets in Southeast Asia have generated not only tremendous 
growth but also tremendous ethnic hatred and instability” (Chua 2004:47). Neil J. 
KresseTs recent book Mass Flate: The Global Rise o f  Genocide and Terror (2002) goes 
so far as to claim that human brutality erupted and expanded in the twentieth century 
with the advancement of free market global capitalism and “now threatens the very core 
of Western civilization.”
Naomi Klein’s No Logo (2002) offered heart-breaking anecdotes of horrors 
wrought by corporations like Nike, Lévi-Strauss, and Gap. While the virtues of 
growing commerce in and among developing countries have been increasingly 
recognized by economists (Norberg 2002; Novak 1982), scholars like Klein suggest that 
the process is generating a middleman effect whereby the division of labor is 
increasingly squeezing low-end workers out o f their fair share of the economic pie:
17
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The only way to understand how rich and supposedly law-abiding 
multinational corporations could regress to nineteenth-century levels o f 
exploitation (and get caught repeatedly) is through the mechanics of 
subcontracting itself: at every layer of contracting, subcontracting and 
homework, the manufacturers bid against each other to drive down the 
price, and at every level the contractor and subcontractor exact their 
small profit. At the end of this bid-down, contract-out chain is the 
worker— often three or four times removed from the company that 
placed the original order—with a paycheck that has been trimmed at 
every turn (Klein 2002: 212).
Said differently, the true culprit is efficiency. Growing rationalization of 
commerce has confined humanity in the “iron cage” predicted by Weber. Steven 
Sampson (2003, 310) stated that globalization enriches some hut turns others “into truly 
global proletariats who follow the flow of capital” from region to region. Gautney 
(2003) suggests that the globalization of capitalism is promoting a “globalization of 
violence,” a world order where violence is supplanting consent. “Violence is the 
substance o f the 2U‘-century world order, an order marked hy its close proximity to 
pure war” (65).
The role o f force in setting the global distribution of power creates an 
appearance o f a world order increasingly directed toward pure violence.
18
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in which consent—materialized in elections, in consumptive hahits, in a 
general lack o f involvement—emerges as a hollow confirmation of the 
force o f Empire. It is tacit consent as opposed to participation; an anti­
democratic politics of order. The overwhelming presence of violence 
around the globe—from the threat of world destruction to police 
brutality to the technical supervision (Gautney 2003, 68).
Scholars like Chomsky, Gautney, Kortner and Klein share a common belief that 
the violence and anomie allegedly wrought by economic free markets in western 
societies during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have now been spread 
across the globe with the expansion of global capitalism since the 1980s. Accordingly, 
the turn of the twenty-first century has seen “an escalation o f war, preparation for war, 
and political repression” (Brecher 2003, 202). Jonathan Friedman, editor of a collection 
o f recent essays dealing with the relationship between global neoliberalism and 
violence, concludes that the current situation produces “increasing violence of various 
kinds, in which the character o f the violence is increasingly based on processes of 
fragmentation of former political units and on the intensive incorporation of the new 
fragments into regional and global circuits o f control and finance by both state and 
nonstate actors” (Friedman 2003, xiv).
Some alienation theorists see the violence attributed to capitalism as a product of 
gap between the haves and have nots that capitalism allegedly creates. Noam Chomsky, 
one of the most visible contemporary proponents of the alienation model, claims that 
“the increasing polarization of the society that’s heen going on for the past twenty-five
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years, and the marginalization of large sectors of the population” is to hlame for an 
alleged increase in violent crime (2003b). “[T]he basic ideology [of contemporary 
capitalism] is that a person’s human rights depend on what they can get for themselves 
in the market system, they have no human value” (2003b; 33). “Larger and larger 
sectors o f the population have no form of organization and no viable, constructive way 
of reacting, so they pursue the available options, which are often violent” (33).
The Alienation Concept in Literature and Folklore
The belief that primitive societies are more harmonious than modem ones is 
“deeply engrained in scholarly discourse” (Fdgerton 1992, 2). Durkheim, Weber, and 
Marx all believed in this notion (Fdgerton 1992, 3). In fact, the theory predates 
sociology. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins o f  Inequality suggested 
in 1754 that inequality was created by the cormption that followed from modem 
society’s adoption o f private property. Rousseau made the man-coirupted-hy- 
modemity paradigm popular throughout Europe for a century (Hocutt 2003).
Looking farther back, one can find the idea of a perfect society cormpted 
by selfishness and wickedness in man’s earliest myths. The Bible begins with a 
tale o f man’s fall from grace in antiquity, and his banishment from the Garden 
of Eden, where he is exposed to the suffering and stmggle o f hard labor, 
jealousy, and interpersonal competition (Rudgley 1999, 1). Immediately 
following the Bible’s Book of Genesis is the story of Noah and his ark, which 
represents a flipside of this same myth; it provides a vision of man sinking into 
sin, wickedness, and selfishness. Noah, a rare pillar of morality who followed
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God’s instructions, survived God’s wrath against the world by weathering a 40- 
day flood within the safe confines of a ship that he constructed in strict 
compliance with God’s orders (Exodus 1-12). A return to peacefulness and 
harmony was experienced briefly with the reestablishment of communal living, 
but the Bible then proceeds, through hundreds of pages, to recount man’s retreat 
into sin and selfishness. This retreat escalates as Jesus is executed, and 
culminates in an apocalypse described in the Book of Revelations. Harmony 
returns (for true believers) after the crisis is over. Like Marx’s communist 
utopia, this end time shall have no poor in the land (Deut. 15:4, R.V.) and all 
people will live in peace and contentment, each under his own grape vine and 
fig tree (Matt. 18:6-14). There will be no disinherited and no unfit, and all 
people will have equal access to the Tree of Life (Rev. 21:22).
To some extent this version of human events was recreated in sociology in the 
writings of Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), who viewed human antiquity as typified by 
mechanical solidarity in which individuals acted in concert for the good of the 
community. Durkheim contrasted this solidarity with life in “the economic world” of 
today in which anomie describes man’s increasing instability, escalating conflict, and 
social unrest, manifesting in high rates of suicide and homicide (Durkheim 1941, 40):
If, in proportion as societies pass from the lower to the higher types, 
the rate o f criminality, i.e., the relation between the yearly number of 
crimes and the population, tended to decline, it might be believed that 
crime, while still normal, is tending to lose this character of normality.
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But we have no reason to helieve that such a regression is substantiated.
Many facts would seem rather to indicate a movement in the opposite 
direction. From the begirming of the [nineteenth] century, statistics 
enable us to follow the course o f criminality. It has everywhere 
increased. In France the increase is nearly 300 per cent (Durkheim 
1986 [1895] 65) (emphasis added).
The Stage Theory of Capitalism 
Looked at through the lens established by the alienation paradigm, capitalism 
might indeed be looked upon as something of a flash in the pan, an anomaly in an 
otherwise grand social pageant of communitarian cooperation. The alienation paradigm 
not only assumes that capitalism is a recent anomaly, but also that it is wholly 
temporary. A sub-theory of this same paradigm, often expressed in academic writing, is 
the notion that capitalist economies develop by stages. Thus, capitalism grows until the 
various contradictions inherent in capitalism mount to crisis, and capitalism is 
destroyed, fades away, or disintegrates. The final stage, like the ultimate paradise 
foretold in the Bible, will be a return to the placid Garden of Eden where people shared 
the earth’s resources. Engels claimed this final stage o f triumph would simply be a 
return to these placid origins, of togetherness and equality from whence humanity 
rose—“a revival, in a higher form, of the liberty, equality and fraternity o f the ancient 
gentes” (1884, 22). Utopians tend to see the ancient world as the utopia they advocate 
interupted by the ignominies o f the present.
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The origins o f this concept are ancient. The stage theory of capitalism assumes 
that capitalism—being merely a contemporary, western phenomenon—has a distinct 
beginning, middle, and end. It began, according to Marx and Weber, in the late Middle 
Ages when Europeans began to monetize time and labor,® passed through its midlife as 
industrialization spread across the globe, and will end, according to Marxists, when 
workers’ wages are suppressed to their lowest possible value. Caught in a “self­
reinforcing spiral of destructive competition”—western humanity lunges headlong 
toward an ultimate date with the Armageddon envisioned by Marx and the author of 
Revelations (Rosenau 2003, 6).
Like apocalyptic visionaries reading Revelations, alienationists have patiently 
awaited capitalism’s overthrow. Many scholars have suggested we are now living in 
“late” capitalism, or the final stage before utopia (e.g., Jameson 1993; Korten 1995; 
Gautney 2003; Chomsky 2003). The credibility of this claim, however, is undermined 
by the recurrent claims of capitalism’s finality dating back to the time of Marx. In 
1916, Lenin wrote a book entitled Imperialism: The Highest Stage o f Capitalism, which 
anticipated utopia no later than a few years after its publication. Borrowing from Marx, 
Lenin proclaimed that imperialism was the “monopoly stage of capitalism”—or the last 
stage to be expected before capitalism’s overthrow. Lenin’s thesis was proved false, 
however, when the imperial powers retreated from their empires throughout the world 
in the post Word War Two period (Arrighi 1978, 9-34).
The idea that we at this precise moment are in the midst of an especially hyper- 
consumerist, ultra-capitalist stage is part o f the current mainstream sociological 
“paradigm.” As Ritzer states, “McDonaldization”—his code for hypercapitalism— “is
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an infinitely more mature and more powerful force today than it was when [he] first 
began thinking about it two decades ago” (2000,xiii).
Even social scientists who have rebuked Marxism generally have nonetheless 
accepted the idea that capitalism has stages and that it will ultimately play out and 
disappear when class disparity becomes too stratified (Novak 1982; Drucker 1986). 
Robert K. Merton, in his celebrated 1938 essay “Social Structure and Anomie” claimed 
that there was “a growing body of evidence” to the effect that capitalism had entered a 
climactic stage in which “our class structure is becoming rigidified and that vertical 
mobility is declining” (1938, 273). Irving Louis Horowitz proclaimed in 1977 that 
contemporary capitalist economies were in the midst of “an intensification o f class 
competition” (1977, 215).
Upon historical scrutiny, however, it is not difficult to find statements uttered 
generations or even centuries ago suggesting life was in a peculiarly breakneck and 
critical stage of hecticness. Global trade has apparently always seemed breakneck. In 
the year 1014, the Archbishop Wulfstan, preaching in York, proclaimed that “The world 
is in a rush and is getting close to its end,” (Norberg 2003, 20). Washington Irving 
wrote in 1822 that “Nations are fast losing their nationality. The great and increasing 
intercourse, the exchange of fashions and uniformity o f opinions by the diffusion of 
literature are fast destroying those peculiarities that formerly prevailed.” Tocqueville 
wrote in the 1830s that American shipping entrepreneurs had accelerated the rate of 
ocean-crossing commerce to the most cutthroat level imaginable even by that time. The 
number of ocean-going ships bearing U.S. flags, wrote Tocqueville, had “grown at 
almost as quick a rate as the number of [America’s] inhabitants” (Toqueville 401-402).
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The discovery of oil as a source for locomotive energy in large quantities near 
Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859 produced a similar level of commentary about 
“hypercapitalism.” A recurring oil boom with “the rush for leases, [ ] frantic 
wildcatting, [ ] overproduction and wars among refiners, [] disastrous fires,” and the 
hectic economic scramble for profits (Furnas 1969, 671).’ To some, this 
hypercapitalism seemed to represent the “last” stage around the twentieth century, and 
an immense progressive movement arose in the United States to arrest the runaway 
machinery o f the oil, steel, and railroad empires o f the “robber barons.”
Although so many of Marx’s theoretical propositions have been disproved by 
events that occurred subsequent to his life (Lakatos 1978), few contemporary scholars 
have challenged his “stage” theory o f capitalism. Indeed only a handful of prominent 
scholars have paused to question the idea that “capitalism” has a definitive beginning, 
middle, and end. Dahrendorf (1997) wrote that this depiction of a multi-stage 
capitalism contains built-in contradictions. For juxtaposed against this conception of 
capitalism as a temporary state is a conception of an extended reign of a utopian 
collective or communitarian state which will follow capitalism’s defeat. Dahrendorf 
suggested that this conception of an indefinite collectivist utopia was “curriously static” 
(p. 41).
Alienation Theorists Have Failed to Predict Dates 
And if  catastrophe has been imminent for capitalism for decades, the greatest 
economic minds have failed to accurately predict when it will occur. In 1958, Harvard 
economist John Kenneth Galbraith wrote what became a renowned nonfiction best-
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seller, The Affluent Society. Galbraith claimed that the biggest corporations were 
approaching absolute monopoly and were essentially immune to the marketplaee. 
General Motors, according to Galbraith, was “large enough to control its markets” and 
no longer feared competition over market share (Sowell 1995, 66). These predictions, 
like those o f Marx, Engels, and Lenin before him, have been disproved (Sowell 1995, 
66): dozens o f major corporations have folded, declined, or disappeared, and almost 
half o f corporations on the Fortune 500 in 1980 were not there ten years later (Sowell 
1995). During the latter half o f the twentieth century, small businesses gained market 
share against big businesses (Norberg 2003).
If “capitalism” is not a stage, but an extension o f innate human tendency, then 
there is no basis to assume that profit-driven capitalism alienates people from their true 
nature. Humanity has not jumped o ff track, but is quite thoroughly and healthily on 
track. “Capitalism”— open markets where individuals and firms are able to exchange 
their goods and services freely—is the essence o f social health and vitality. 
Consequently, attempts to arrest or hamper it lead to social disruption and dysfunction.
The Role o f Ideas
Scholars who contend that capitalism is a temporary condition tend also to argue 
that capitalism depends on an ideology for its continuing existence. Weber’s 
conception o f capitalism as a “spirit” in the title o f his most famous work furthered this 
construction (Wrong 2004, 27). Karl Polany argued that “laissez-faire was planned” 
(Blyth 2004, 118). Under the reconstruction of these scholars, markets certainly existed 
in history, but market society represents an entirely new social form, “in which labor is
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seen as just another factor o f production, divorced from notions of reciprocity and 
obligation” (Blyth 2004, 119). “This was the new world of laissez faire” (Blyth 2004, 
119). “As Karl Polanyi shows in The Great Transformation, the emergence o f natural 
markets in Europe was not the mechanical product of the gradual extension of economic 
exchanges, but the product of a deliberately mercantilist state policy aimed at increasing 
domestic and foreign trade” (Bourdieu 2001, 2).
The spirit, or ideology of capitalism that originated in Europe, was promoted by 
merchants for their own interests, and made to seem rational by promoters in the 
sciences and literature, notably Adam Smith. “[Ljaissez-faire actions come from 
laissez-faire ideas and institutions they make possible” (Blyth 2004, 129).
“The new order needed a ‘philosophy,’” according to economic historian Robert 
Heilbroner, “[a]nd such a philosophy was by no means self-evident” (Heilbroner 1975, 
64). According to this view, “the new world of profit-seeking individuals” was 
dependent upon a small group of self-interested mercantilist “pamphleteers” who 
promoted capitalism as something of a religion (Heilbroner 1975, 64). Chief among 
these capitalist pampheleteers, of course, was the father o f economics, Adam Smith.
The philosophical underpinnings o f this “spirit,” according to alienation 
theorists, began in the timultuous rejection of Catholic orthodoxy during the Protestant 
Reformation and were later reinforced by eighteenth-century pamphleteers like Adam 
Smith. Eventually, this new economic paradigm spawned a new “cultural logic”—an 
underlying paradigmatic orientation that pervades human life. Pauline Vaillancourt 
Rosenau’s The Competition Paradigm (2003) describes capitalism as the product of a 
theoretical paradigm—the competition paradigm—that is unsustainable. Capitalism has
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entered a purified form, says Jameson, whereby multinational corporations have greatly 
increased the range of “capitalized” and commercialized products and fostered a “a 
prodigious expansion of capital into hitherto uncommodified areas” (Jameson 1984,
78). Even art, architecture, and other aesthetic products have been commodified to be 
bought and sold in the marketplace as merchandise (Jameson 1984).
Still others have alleged that capitalism was originally created by public 
officials. Hine (2002, 50) suggests that “[tjhere is nothing ‘natural’ about markets” and 
that market trading was invented by governments who intended traders to abide by strict 
regulations. Since the dawn of the Industrial revolution, however, market-exchange 
economics has gotten loose from its state-sanctioned tethers and now holds the western 
world in a hegemonic grip. Hine claims markets originated in Egypt and ancient 
Greece and Turkey when rulers provided fairs and other venues for trade. Regional 
city-states guaranteed protection to anyone on his or her way to the fairs (p. 58), 
licensed vendors, and censored dishonest merchants (57, 56). During the fairs, a 
“highly restrictive legal code” regulated and taxed vendors (56). “The fair was not 
merely about commerce,” according to Hine, but was a time for celebration of a patron 
saint or devotion to religious officials, a holy day or “holiday.” In which the state acted 
as market coordinator. In contrast,
[tjoday, most of us spend our lives in a perpetual fair. Someone tries to 
sell us something nearly every waking moment, and we can buy 
casually, impersonall, with no wearing negotiation or personal contact.
The act o f consumption, which was once so exceptional an act in lives
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dominated by laborious production, is now commonlace and incessant.
We are all in the market all the time (Hine 2002, 59).
The original markets, according to Hine (2002, 56), required strict regulation by 
the religious authorities who sanctioned them. “The market itself is a kind of 
battlefield, as both buyers and sellers seek to charm and intimidate their way to an 
acceptable price.” Without state oversight, markets would quickly degenerate into 
violent struggles for property ownership.
The Academic Consensus
Although by no means held universally,^ belief in an alienation explanation for 
human violence is very popular in contemporary social science. Every professor o f 
sociology’s office is adorned with bookshelves that contain works attributing human 
violence to capitalism, greed, profiteering, lust for property, and class domination. The 
belief that regulated economies are more peaceful than free market economies is widely 
held among sociologists today (Edgerton 1993). Generations of scholars within the 
social sciences have found themselves obsessed with debunking, exposing, battling, and 
“ameliorating the damages” o f capitalism, as George Ritzer puts it (2004, xvi).
It can safely be said that the alienation proposition represents a broad consensus 
o f opinion within sociology and other social sciences. This historical metanarrative has 
even been promoted by the highest offices within the discipline of Sociology. Joe R. 
Feagin (2001,4), in his inaugural address as president of the American Sociological 
Association (ASA) in 2001, asserted without qualification that contemporary capitalism
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is to blame for “racial and ethnic oppression, patriarchy, homophobia, bureaucratic 
authoritarianism, violence against children, and discrimination against the aged and the 
disabled.” (Feagin 2001, 4). “Markets reduce everything, including human beings 
(labor) and nature (land), to commodities” (4).
In the ASA’s official 1996 report on the social causes of violence, authors Felice 
J. Levine and Katherine J. Rosich indicated that violence, even when collective, is a 
product of individual, anti-social impulses and that a more communitarian, cooperative 
society would ameliorate violence. Beginning with the statement that “American 
society is engulfed in a world o f violence,” the 1996 report launched an ambitious drive 
for more research (and research dollars) to answer the question of what causes violence 
in U.S. society (1, vii). “The pervasiveness of violence, its spiraling negative impacts, 
and the emergence of what appears to be an ingrained pattern of violence are all 
manifestations of a crisis at the most fundamental levels of our social order” the report 
concluded (p. 1).
Reading this scholarship, one is tempted to believe that a link between growing 
capitalism and increasing violence has been proven. But violent crime has fallen double 
digits in the United States since the 1980s even while all indexes o f capitalism indicate 
that most states have embarked on economic agendas that have generally emphasized 
deregulation and freer markets (Apuzzo 2004). Violence appears to have declined 
throughout most parts o f the world since the Second World War (Payne 2004). This has 
been especially true in industrializing nations.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The overall trajectory o f capitalism perceived by Weber, Marx, and Durkheim appears 
to be correct even if  their dates were wrong. It seems undeniable that capitalism is 
generally on the increase. However the perception that increasing capitalism generates 
increasing social violence appears to rest on much shallower sand. Moreover, the 
overarching proposition promoted by the alienation theorists, the notion that 
“capitalism”—broadly defined— is a modem, artificial, western invention, dependent on 
the spread of a market ideology among its participants, seems vulnerable to increasingly 
irreconcilable research findings
Scholars have been developing an increasingly mountainous record o f private 
ownership of land and property (and therefore, capital) since Polanyi’s early writings 
(Frank 1993, 385). And since the 1970s, “the empirical and analytical refutation of the 
[Marx/Engels/Polany] argument has been almost unceasing. The evidence—primarily 
from archaeological finds—has been substantial” (Frank 1993, 385).
The historical interpretations o f the founders o f sociology have fared poorly 
against contemporary archaeological, anthropological, and historical developments. To 
some extent the nineteenth- and early twentieth century theorists who spawned the 
scientific study of society may be excused because of the state of anthropology and 
archaeology at the time when these they wrote. Weber’s knowledge of ancient societies
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and civilizations, for example, was profound and rich, and perhaps as great as any 
scholar o f his own period.^ But Weber wrote during the 1890s and early twentieth 
century when accounts of the economies o f ancient India, China and the Mediterranean 
were either nonexistent or not abundant (Andreski 12). He thus was forced to consult 
primary sources either translated or in the original Greek, Latin or Italian (each of 
which Weber read fluently) (Weber 1983, 12). Weber’s resulting metathesis, like 
Marx’s and Durkheim’s has been attacked by dozens if  not hundreds of works since the 
1930s (Mackinnon 1993, 243). Marshall (1982) pointed out that Weber’s demarcation 
between pre- and post Reformation economies is untenable. “Rational” firms, a free 
market in labor and commodities, rational technology, a calculable legal system all 
existed prior to the Protestant Reformation (Cohen 1980).
While Marx and Weber can be forgiven for making mistakes of interpretation 
regarding human economic history, contemporary scholars should be given no such 
exemption, however, and their theoretical suppositions need to be strenuously examined 
in light of current knowledge.
The more knowledge we have, the more we know that the economic system 
Weber attributed only to Western thinkers was actually far more common in the world 
than Weber believed. Private property was well protected even in the Athenian courts 
(Adams 1993, 66). The claims o f Weber, Marx, and Polanyi and their defenders in 
anthropology, history, and sociology have long been challenged with regard to pre­
industrial social and economic arrangements (Frank, 385). The evidence accumulated 
during the twentieth century, according to David Herlihy (1971, 154-55) has “all but 
wiped from the ledgers the supposed gulf, once thought fundamental, between a
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medieval manorial economy and the capitalism of the modem period.” Ancient trade, 
“both interlocal and international, was geographically extensive and highly profitable”'® 
but had a feudal ruling class at the helm. (Weber 1983, 33). Since the 1970s, 
researchers have developed an increasingly mountainous record of private ownership of 
land and property among ancient societies (Frank 1993, 385). “[T]he empirical and 
analytical refutation o f the [stage theory] argument has been almost unceasing. The 
evidence—primarily from archaeological finds—has been substantial” (Frank 1993, 
385). Lamberg-Karlovsky (1975) found that profit, wholesaling, supply-demand 
pricing and production, and private ownership of land have “existed in a market 
network at least by the end of the fourth millennium in Mesopotamia.”
Trade in Early Civilization
By the time of the first major civilizations in Sumeria and Mesopotamia, 
commerce in goods and merchandise was already systematic. Clay tablets with 
notations representing records of barley transactions before the founding of any o f the 
early civilizations have been found at many locations (Robinson 1999, 62-63). By the 
early second millennium B.C., trade routes with numerous ports of call were evident 
throughout the Old World, and private ships available for hire plied their trade over the 
seas and oceans (Silver 1983, 821).
Frank (1993, 388) concluded that a “single world system [with] historical 
continuity for at least 5,000 years, emerged with its core in West Asia and Egypt, and 
then spread to encompass much of Afro-Eurasia.” This system extended across 
languages and into deepest Africa, the Far East, Although centered in West and
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Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, it extended far into three surrounding 
continents (Frank 1993, 383). The motive force o f this worldwide system of trade was 
capital accumulation (Frank 1993, 388). Moreover, “profit-motivated trade extended 
far beyond the political borders o f any state and connected . . . [all o f these] into a single 
world system” (Kohl 1989, 227).
Markets in Labor
One of Weber’s most important and often-repeated points is that the Middle 
Ages were special because they signaled a switch from slave and feudal labor systems 
to market wage labor (141). Weber suggested that labor before this time was “unfree,” 
and thus incapable of sustaining capitalistic market economies (141). But evidence 
accumulated since Weber’s death indicates he was incorrect on this point. There were 
daily wages from 2000 B.C. in parts of Eurasia, and wage rates determined by supply 
and demand (Silver 1983, 809). A drachma per day in fifth- and fourth-century (B.C.) 
Athens was a “standard wage” for most workers (Jones 1952, 26). There were both sale 
and rental markets for slaves in Babylon, suggesting that slave labor was integrated into 
an overall supply-and-demand labor system (Silver 808). Marx and Weber also 
overstated the role of feudal production relationships even in the Middle Ages. Half of 
English peasants worked for wages during the fourteenth century (Hejeebu and 
CcCloskey 2004: 136).
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The Commodification Of Humanity 
Alienation theorists like former ASA President Joe Feagin have sometimes 
claimed that the commodification of humanity brought on by modem capitalism 
explains why capitalism is so harmful to social health (Feagin 2001, 4). Yet the sale 
and purchase of humanity in various contexts has an ancient pedigree. Bail bonds to 
secure a prisoner’s release were known in Ancient Egypt from at least 250 B.C.
(Reichel 2002, 80). Hejeebu and McCloskey (2004; 137) point out that“[i]n the 
European Middle Ages more (depending on how you count these things) was for sale 
than is for sale now: husbands, wives, slaves, serfs, kingdoms, market days, and eternal 
salvation.” “Medieval Europe was thoroughly monetized” (137).
Medieval systems of criminal justice were also much more monetized than 
criminal justice systems o f today. Medieval courts operated in accordance with the 
profits they made for monarchs that administered them (Diamond 1978, 250). This was 
tme in Norman-age England as well as eleventh century Russia, where Article 1 o f the 
code provided for simple systems of fines for even the most heinous crimes:
If a man kills a man . . .  the brother is to avenge his brother; the son, his 
father; or the father, his son; and the son of the brother (of the murder 
victim) or the son of his sister, their respective uncle. If there is no 
avenger (the murderer) pays 40 grivna wergild . . .  (Diamond 1978,
244).
The law of the Visigoths, circa 700 A.D., similarly stated that
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Whoever shall have killed a man, whether he committed a homicide 
intendeing to or not intendeing to . . .  let him be handed over into the 
protestas of the parents or next of kin of the deceased . . .  (Diamond 
1978, 244).
If anything, the employment of labor in the ancient world was much more 
diverse than it is in western societies today. There were many more types of 
employment contracts, forms of servitude, and slavery. A huge slave trade, with great 
fluctuations in price, thrived throughout the ancient Eurasian tricontinental region 
(Silver 1983, 808). Slavery in the ancient world often provided opportunities for slaves 
to prosper, buy or be granted their freedom and move up through class ranks. In ancient 
Rome, commerce and industry were heavily led by businessmen who were former 
slaves (Baumol 1990, 900). Slavery “may have represented the one avenue for 
advancement for someone from the lower classes” (900). After acquiring business 
experience, a slave might be retired into the ranks o f investor and businessman. Many 
apparently retired wealthy in the countryside with investments in land and banking 
(900).
Banking In Early Civilizations 
As Hoskins (1985, 5) wrote, “Since the earliest times there have been banks and 
bankers,” “operated simply to bring a person with money together with a person who 
needed money and together they became partners in a Joint Venture business enterprise.
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For this service banks charged fee.” Clay lending tokens issued by bankers are found in 
great quanitites today in the Eurasian excavations of ancient Babylon (Hoskins 1985, 6). 
There were both government banks and private banks such as the Igibi Bank which 
flourished in 575 B. C. (Hoskins 1985, 6). “These banks offered almost every service 
offered by banks today including the use o f checking, savings, letters of credit, and the 
Babylonian form of paper money—the clay tablet” (Hoskins 1985, 6). In ancient 
Egypt, a canal dug from the Nile to the Red Sea was a commercial speedway. Boats 
coming fom India could stop by banking barges anchored in the canal and get a loan 
“day or night” (Hoskins 1985, 6).
Relationships Between Commerce And War
If ever there was a time in human history when profit motives were nonexistent, 
historical texts have failed to identify this period. The claim made hy alienation 
theorists that greed and avarice are a product of industrialism are false. Judas, after all, 
betrayed Jesus for 30 pieces of silver around A.D. 33.
Competition over the fruits of business seems to have heen a factor in many of 
the world’s early wars. The very first well-documented war, the Trojan War, was 
fought over trading rights in the Aegean Sea (Keegan 1993, 241). Many other wars in 
ancient times were actually efforts to recruit labor for commercial ventures. Max 
Weber characterized many ancient wars as “slave raids” because their purpose was to 
“throw more supplies upon the slave market” (Weber 1983, 141). Commercialism and 
profit motives were behind much o f European colonialism during the seventeenth and
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eighteenth centuries. Nearly all settlements in North America were commercial 
ventures even centuries before the industrial revolution (Hine 2002).
Even the seemingly moralistic American abolitionists whose agitation against 
slavery drove the United States to civil war in 1860 were buoyed by selfish economic 
interests: northerners thought slave labor put them at a disadvantage in the marketplace 
(Hall 1987, xii). Similar economic motivations fueled southern secessionists: federal 
tariff rates imposed by northern policymakers to equalize the southern slave advantage 
made trade barriers restrictively high for the South’s cotton economy and drove 
southerners to seek restoration of free trade through violence (DiLorenzo 2004). So 
too, slavery was finally eradicated throughout the world because of economic 
considerations. The nail in the coffin o f worldwide slavery was its relative inefficiency 
as a system for delivering labor services. Slave workers had no economic incentives to 
work hard and consequently sat idle when not watched (Nisbett and Cohen 1996, 3).
Taxation of business and commerce was also a prevalent cause o f wars in 
history. Taxation in the Roman Empire is credited by many historians with fostering 
violent revolts that ultimately destroyed the Roman Empire (Payne 2004, 203). The 
French Revolution was caused in part by the burdensome French tax system (Payne 
2004, 206). During the initial uprising, tax offices were sacked and a wall erected to 
prevent the flow o f untaxed goods into Paris was tom down. As the Revolution 
progressed, thirty-four top tax officials were executed (p. 206). The American 
Revolution, of course, was an effort to repeal a series o f tax acts that impeded the flow 
o f goods in commerce across the Atlantic Ocean. Many o f the initial targets of violence 
by colonists were government tax collectors.
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The distinction between modem industrial capitalism and pre-medieval markets 
has been shown to be a fiction. So too, the proposition that westem industrial capitalism 
represents a stark transformation in human behavior has been undermined by 
scholarship written subsequent to the publication o f The Protestant Work Ethic.
Seeking evidence of capitalist trade in the ancient world was once much like 
trying to find the evidence that Darwin (1995) cited as support for his theory of 
evolution. The geologic record, wrote Darwin, was “a history of the world imperfectly 
kept, and written in a changing dialect; of this history we possess the last volume alone, 
relating to only two or three countries; O f this volume, only here and there a short 
chapter has been preserved; and of each page, only here and there a few lines” (p. 166).
But we are approaching sufficient evidence to make a few statements about the 
accuracy of the prehistoric narrative of the alienation theorists; they were wrong about 
the dearth of for-profit private trade prior to the Middle Ages. As scholarly inquiries 
have delved deeper and deeper into the past, their discoveries of commerce in the 
ancient world have expanded exponentially. Ancient peoples are now seen as much 
more technologically skilled, numerous, and organized than archaeologists previously 
believed (Milanich 2004). Merely comparing the definitions of capitalism provided by 
Weber, Polanyi, et al., with the findings of modem archaeology undermines the 
alienation proposition. Polanyi’s definition of “market economy” required as many as a 
half-dozen distinct elements, including (1) consumer goods, (2) commodified land, (3) 
labor through supply and demand, risk bearing individual enterprise, and loan markets 
(Silver 1983, 796). Similarly, Weber’s definition required no fewer than six distinct 
phenomena acting in unison: 1) the appropriation o f means of production are in private
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hands 2) there are free markets, 3) there is mechanization o f production, 4) predictable 
law governing business affairs, 5) free labor, and 6) a ’’commercialization of economic 
life”—meaning a robust culture of commercial (i.e., banking and financing) instruments 
(Weber 1999, 44). All of these have existed since the second millenium B.C. in the 
Near East, and probably earlier and elsewhere.
We now know that even Adam Smith underestimated the extent of prehistoric 
commerce and thus can be said to have underplayed his position. Smith plotted the rise 
o f agribusiness and manufacturing as first appearing in Egypt (Smith 1991 [1776], 27). 
He suggested, in error, that ancient Rome represented the first appearance of minted 
coins, pointing to references by Pliny the Elder to the effect that coined money first 
appeared in the time of Servius Tullius. But in fact, coins are substantially older. 
Archeologists have found coins and other media o f exchange (and thus, evidence of 
standardized trade, if  not “capitalism”) among the artifacts of some o f the earliest 
protocivilized societies, from ancient Mesopotamia to Phoenicia, to Sumeria, to the 
ancient Americas (Frank 1993; McCAdams 1992; Silver 1983; Brumfiel 1980; Waddell 
1929). According to Toynbee’s Study o f  History, more than 650 primitive societies 
have been categorized by anthropologists, and since “most of these have used one or 
more forms of primitive money, it follows that the subject of primitive money is o f vast 
proportions” and that the tendency to invent currency is something of a universal human 
trait (Davies 1994, 34).
To the extent that coins represent evidence of routinized exchange of property 
among individuals, we have evidence that ancient societies on every inhabited continent 
engaged in such exchanges once they were able to shape materials into coins. Almost
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every conceivable precious metal, with the exception o f platinum and palladium, seem 
to have been used as media of exchange at one time or another (Silver 1983, 818). 
Coins, or currency, “one o f the finest achievements of human reasoning powers” 
(Temple 99), represent a systematic means of measuring value that drastically decreases 
transaction costs (Silver 1983).
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CHAPTER 4
ALIENATION AND THE ARCHEOLOGICAL RECORD
Archaeology, like sociology, owes its origins to the late nineteenth century and 
did not begin in professional earnest until the 1870s (Amsden 1949, 22).
Archaeological knowledge was limited to scattered and poorly catalogued finds, 
anecdotes, and conjecture. Marx never knew of the findings of Sir Arthur John Evans, 
or of Hiram Bingham, and Weber was an old man when the first diggings were made at 
the tomb of Tutankhamen.
Thus, it stands to reason that the theoretical underpinnings o f the early 
sociologists suffered from blindness where they depended upon knowledge of 
anthropology and archaeology. Stated more accurately, the interpretations of ancient 
societies advanced by the founders of sociology were largely conceptual rather than 
factual. And we now know that some of these early conceptions were quite simply 
wrong.
Marx’s interpretation of economic history fares especially poorly when 
juxtaposed against the archeological record. Not only is capitalism much older than 
orthodox Marxism has depicted it, but capitalism is decidedly more diverse in its 
origins. The archeological record now seems to indicate that market economies with 
property-right protection arose separately in different parts of the globe. Civilized 
societies developed currencies generally before they developed written languages.
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The first great civilizations were empires of private as well as public trade. 
Ancient Egypt was a mecca for transcontinental trade in commodities from three 
continents. Egyptian mines were yielding forty thousand kilograms of gold per year 
during the second millennium B.C., an amount which was never again reached in world 
production until the nineteenth century (Oliver and Page 1970, 39)." Marxist social 
scientists have long argued that Egypt was a centrally-controlled redistributive society 
(Silver 801). But Silver (1983, 801) points out that “private ownership as well as sale 
and leasing o f land are found throughout Egyptian history.” Interest-bearing loans 
apparently existed in grain (801) circa 2000 B.C. “It is well known that private 
individuals could own farm land at all periods of ancient Egyptian history” (Silver 
1983, 807, citing Baer 1962).
“By the middle centuries o f the fourth m illennium,. . . [t]he trade relations of 
Gerzean Egypt were very extensive” (Oliver and Page 1970, 34). Metals like lead and 
silver were regularly imported from island ports in the Aegean sea (Oliver and Page 
1970, 34). Shipbuilders were building vessels of sixty oars (Oliver and Page 1970, 34). 
Egypt thrived in later second millennium B.C., with constant stream of oil, wine, olives, 
fish, cucumbers, salt, garments, and papyrus (821).
Historians and archaeologists have debated Egypt’s fall from prominence for 
centuries. One of the most compelling explanations is simple economic competition. 
Like the once-gigantic A & P grocery chain that succumbed to the explosion o f discount 
suburban U.S. supermarkets of the 1950s and ‘60s (Sowell 2000, 59-62), Egypt found 
itself unable to adjust to the age of iron. Discoveries around the ancient ruins o f Meroe, 
in central Africa, have found piles of iron slag suggesting that Meroe became a
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Birmingham of the ancient world (Oliver and Page 1970, 41). But due to its geography 
and centuries o f overgrazing, Egypt had neither iron ore nor fuel with which to smelt it 
(Oliver and Page 1970, 41).
Political Economy In Ancient Texts
If “capitalism” represents the implementation of an ideology that was recently 
imposed upon human societies, one is hard pressed to identify when in the history of 
human discourse people first began to state their belief in this ideology." And if 
recognition of private property was rare in ancient societies, man’s earliest documents 
are highly unrepresentative o f ancient human cultures. Adam Smith’s first rule—the 
law of supply and demand, and the corresponding fact that items in short supply sell at 
high prices—was expressed at least two thousand years before the birth of Adam Smith, 
in the later second millennium B.C. (Silver 1983, 808). Since time immemorial, when 
people have written about their lives, they have written about markets, trade goods, 
property, and commerce. Much of what we know about humanity’s past is to be found 
in written records, and many o f the earliest written records were business documents. 
The earliest and most recurring myths, upon examination, often deal with the quest for 
riches. “[A] lot of our heroic literature is about someone who is trying to get his hands 
on a valuable object. Jason sailed after the Golden Fleece. The Arthurian legends 
recount the quest for the Holy Grail. Wagner’s characters and Tolkien’s, too, are after a 
ring” (Hine 2002, 9).
In the land known to myth as the Garden of Eden, to history as ancient Babylon, 
and to modernity as Iraq," texts from the later third millennium already show street
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vendors and, “the use of silver to pay rentals and purchase dates, oil, barley, animals, 
slaves, and real estate” (Silver 1983, 817). “[NJumerous lending contracts o f an entirely 
commercial nature” have been identified dating from ancient Babylon in the second 
millennium B.C. (Silver 1983, 803). Trade in ancient Babylon apparently reached a 
breakneck pace around the 1800s (B.C.) when Babylonian businessmen were engaged 
in a variety o f enterprises in the Persian Gulf. Thirty-three pounds o f gold was payment 
for one private contract (Silver 1983, 804). Speculation contracts which specified 
penalties for future violations, promissory notes payable to the bearer(s), real estate 
deeds, and letters o f credit were all in use by the fourteenth century B.C. (Silver 1983, 
804-806). Sales and leases of real estate were common in Mesopotamia throughout its 
history, and land markets offered guarantees of good title (Silver 1983, 806). Loan 
documents have been found evidencing financial transactions from the middle to the 
end of the third millennium B.C. throughout Egypt, Babylon, and the ancient near east 
(Silver 1983, 802). Many people are familiar with the Hippocratic Oath— an agreement 
to create and work within a trade union originating (probably) around 400 B.C. in 
Greece. This oath was a private contract between members of a medical guild and their 
untrained assistants (Miles 2003).
Earliest Law Codes
The earliest law codes—the Code of Hammurabi and the Eshnunna Code, spoke 
of establishment o f standard weights, protected private property, attempted to regulate 
interest rates, mentioned daily wages for farm labor as payable in silver or grain, and 
punished harms to property by fine (Williams 1997, 18). The Code o f Hammurabi
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(circa 1792-1750 B.C.) “emphasized property rights and spoke to such issues as theft, 
ownership, and interpersonal violence” (Reichel 2002, 80). Its rules were developed by 
traders throughout Mesopotamia, emphasizing commercial law and providing 
“reasonable examples o f today’s deeds, partnerships, and other contract forms” (Reicher 
1996,80y
The Bible
Recall the Bible’s many admonitions against greed and its instructions to live 
selflessly. These statements were rendered within a text that was otherwise replete with 
stories of commerce, trade, and profit. The Bible, one of the most detail-rich sources of 
information about ancient Eurasia, contains hundreds o f references to commerce, 
business, and entrepreneurialism {see, e.g.. Genesis 23:12-18; 2 Kings 7:1; Amos 8:4-5; 
Proverbs 11:26). Many o f the featured subjects of the Bible, including Abraham and 
Solomon, were wealthy businessmen (Asimov 1971). Moreover, much of the Bible’s 
content consists of rags-to-riches stories, extolling an apparent economic mobility even 
in a society where various government authorities resisted the empowerment of the 
poor. The Bible describes as heroic numerous struggles by entrepreneurs to evade the 
taxation and regulatory avarice of government authorities, such as Gideon’s 
concealment of wheat from Midianite rulers who would otherwise “destroy the produce 
of the earth as far as Gaza, and leave no sustenance in Israel” (Judges 6:1-6).
The first books of The Bible were apparently a collection o f ancient traditions, 
reduced to writing beginning in the ninth century B.C. and continuing until the time of 
Christ (Asimov 1968). The Bible also contains a number of legal codes—and like
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other early legal codes, the Biblical Law of Moses contains references to greed, envy 
for property o f others, and business affairs. It advises its readers to commit themselves 
to business ethics and to employ accurate and equitable accounting methods {see, e.g.. 
Proverbs 11:1; 20:23)." Note also that the Bible’s Mosaic laws (which include the Ten 
Commandments), probably date to 900 B.C. and clearly recognize private property 
(“Thou shalt not steal”) and title in land (“Ye shall inherit their land . . .  that floweth 
with milk and honey” (Leviticus 20:24)."
Scrutiny of the Old Testament reveals passages indicating that pre-industrial 
mass commercial production was occurring at some locations. There are references to a 
Babylonian “city of metal workers” (1 Chronicles 4:14), and a “valley of craftsmen” 
(Neh. 11:35). A vision by the prophet Ezekiel described merchants rich with 
inventories o f wine, wool, cloth, spices, gems, and gold, who engaged in extremely 
profitable trade with traveling merchants from throughout the Middle East:
All the ships of the sea and the sailors in them visited you to trade with 
you . . . People paid you in silver and iron, tin and lead for your 
merchandise . . . They bartered men and bronze implements. The 
people of Beth-togarmah traded you horses, chargers, mules . . . You 
were paid in ivory tusks and ebony. Edom exchanged carbuncles, 
purple, embroideries, fine linen, coral and rubies against your goods.
Judah and the land of Israel also traded with you, supplying you with 
com . . .  wax, honey, tallow and balm (Ez. 27:9).
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Many scholars have suggested that capitalism was generated by Christianity 
(Weber 1930; Murray 2004). Yet Hejeebu and McCloskey (2004) note that Christianity 
glorifies capitalism much less than other major religions. They note the contrast 
between the Lord’s Prayer, which requests only “our daily bread,” with the Hindu 
prayer to Durga, the Mother Goddess: “Give me wealth, long life, sons, and all things 
desirable” (139). Hindus also pray to Ganesha at the outset of any project for 
“longevity, desired powers, and prosperity” (140). The Vedic hymns are similarly filled 
with prayers for treasure and wealth (140). Zoroastrianists pray for “rewards, 
compensation, and hospitality” and for their communities, “possessions, prosperity,. . . 
and easeful life” (140). Buddha’s “Admonition to Singala” likewise proclaims a 
philosophy never stated better by a neoliberal capitalist:
The wise and moral man . . .
Makes money like a bee . . .
Such a man makes his pile 
As an anthill, gradually . . .
. . .  He should divide 
His money in four parts:
On one part he should live.
With two expand his trade.
And the fourth he should save 
Against a rainy day (Hejeebu and McCloskey 2004, 136).
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Taxation In Early Documents 
The earliest textual artifacts also manifest evidence of taxation, which by its 
very nature represents a taking of private property or wealth by governmental authority. 
There is no known civilization that did not tax, and the dawn of the first civilization we 
know anything about— ancient Sumeria—is recorded on clay cones recorded the 
taxation of the period (Adams 1993, 2). Indeed, a “large percentage o f all ancient 
documents are tax records of one kind or another” (Adams 1993, 21). The ancient 
Egyptians taxed almost everything, including sales, slaves, imports, exports, and 
businesses (Adams 1993, 7). The Rosetta Stone, “the most important Egyptian 
archaeological discovery of all time,” according to Charles Adams (1993, 17) was 
actually a tax document: it gave notice of a tax immunity for a religious temple. 
Taxation was also at the roots of the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah, rooted in the tax 
struggles of the ancient Hebrews against Greek taxation (Adams 1993, 39-43).
The Law’s Growing Recognition O f Private Trade Rights 
There is one sense in which the Weberian definition of capitalism accurately 
reflects the conditions necessary for well-functioning free markets. Capitalistic 
production is most efficient when protected by codes of law that limit the authority of 
governments to intervene in private commerce. While the private contracts of the 
ancient world served to add predictability to exchanges between private parties and 
merchants, they did not restrain government authorities from intruding in personal 
business affairs with every manner of confiscatory taxation and seizure of property.
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What kept capitalist investment from becoming fully routinized in the ancient 
world was the arbitrariness of government economic regulation. “For thousands o f 
years, governments around the world have attempted to set the prices and control 
supplies” (Payne 2004, 255). Rarely have authorities resisted the temptation to tax and 
regulate commerce when they had power to. Trade in commercial markets largely 
operated around such regulation.
It seems that with the passing generations, however, written codes o f law tended 
to become more tolerant of rational trade, and less arbitrary in their control over 
economic matters. The Edict o f  Diocletian (1939), drafted circa 301 A.D. and issued 
and ratified in the name of four Caesars, established a maximum schedule of prices for 
commodities and services throughout the Roman Empire. This edict was purportedly 
the law of the land across several nations for years; inscriptions of it have been found on 
tablets found at different places in Greece and Asia Minor. The Edict imposed the 
death penalty on merchants throughout the empire who charged more than the prices of 
Caesar. “No one should deem this a harsh measure,” the Edict proclaimed, since any 
merchant could easily “avoid its severity by keeping his profits within bounds.” Death 
was also imposed upon merchants who declined to trade commodities they possessed, 
or who hoarded commodities if  the public needed them.
It is not clear if  the Edict o f  Diocletian was ever rescinded or stricken from the 
laws of Rome, but historians note that this code dropped into disuse after merchants 
went out o f business and scarcity of products increased. In some cases, merchants were 
required to sell commodities at lower prices than they paid for them, and bloody street 
brawls and violence followed (p. 3). Nonetheless, the Edict represented a long step
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toward legal sanction for routinized trade and standardized taxation and regulation o f 
business. Although predictability in trade relations was the purpose behind most inter­
merchant contracts, the intrusion of sovereigns into commercial affairs had previously 
been something unpredictable, a domain of great discretion. Law, like other institutions 
o f civilization, took time to develop.
Bills of rights which sought to codify or limit the powers of states were rare or 
nonexistent in ancient texts. The Magna Carta, signed under duress by King John of 
Great Britain in 1215 A.D., may represent the first attempt to establish formal written 
limitations on the power o f a sovereign. But with each passing century, there were 
more and more such documents. The English Bill of Rights was drafted in 1689, the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789, and the American Bill of Rights in 
1791. To the extent that markets function best where property rights are predictable, 
there is support for the idea that rationalized capitalism was on the gradual increase over 
this period.
Robinson (1999) notes that writing itself probably arose from primitive tallies of 
business transactions in ancient Mesopotamia. Although scholars of early written 
languages have been intensely interested in certain important documents, most early 
writing consisted of mundane identity markings and property markers (10). The earliest 
known evidence of writing came from Sumeria around 3300 B.C., probably growing 
out of a long-standing counting system of clay tokens to keep track of goods and 
commodities in trade (11). Such tallies and clay tokens had been used since around
8,000 BC to represent inventories of sheep, grain, or other commodities (58-59). Later 
tokens and clay “envelopes” may have functioned as early bills of lading to accompany
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merchandise shipments (60). Indeed, the evolution of written language probably 
reflected the increasing complexity of commercial affairs throughout the Indo-European 
zone (62). Writing probably evolved from similar origins in the Inca civilization across 
the Atlantic (55).
Marxist historians long believed that Egypt was a redistributive society with 
administrative management o f property (Silver 1983, 801). But we now know that 
“private ownership as well as sale and leasing o f land are found throughout Egyptian 
history” (801). Loan documents involving private persons have been found from the 
middle to the end o f the third millennium (2500-3000 B.C.) throughout Egypt, Babylon, 
and the ancient near east (Silver 1983, 802). There were both sale and rental markets 
for slaves in Babylon (Silver 1983, 808) and daily wages from 2000 B.C. determined by 
supply and demand (Silver 1983, 809). Tanning, metal, garment, and winemaking were 
all done on massive scales in the second millenium B.C. (811-812).
The Americas
Interpretations of archaeological discoveries in the Westem Hemisphere, for 
example, have blown some gaping holes in the Marxist/Weberian “stage” thesis. 
According to Henry F. Dobyns (1966), there were more people living in the Americas 
in 1491 than in Europe (Mann 2002, 43). The sparsely populated New World described 
by the first European visitors to North America was already artificially low—reduced 
by the wildfire spread of disease brought by Italian, French, and Spanish explorers like 
Columbus and DeSoto in the 15**^  and 16* centuries. “The first whites to explore many
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parts of the Americas may therefore have encountered places that were already 
depopulated” (Mann 2002, 43).
Alfred Crosby’s The Columbian Exchange: Biological Consequences o f  1492 
(2003) concluded the Indian groups o f central Mexico independently created nearly all 
the major Neolithic innovations that were invented in Sumeria and Mesopotamia in the 
third millenium BC. And, as in Eurasia, written languages apparently evolved as a 
means of accounting by traders.
The American civilizations, though lacking the wheel and steel, handily 
outmatched the early European civilizations in agriculture, developing strains o f com, 
tomatoes, and potatoes that later sustained societies worldwide (Mann 2002, 48-49).
One theory is that the Amazon rain forest was originally planted as an orchard by 
Native Americans farming fruits, nuts, and palms about 4,000 years ago (Mann 2002, 
51). In the Americas, this agribusiness sustained some of the world’s largest and most 
omate cities, several o f which were larger than Paris or London in the 1500s. Unlike 
European cities, the central American cities employed large forces to keep the crowded 
streets clean o f sewage and detritis (Mann 2002, 49). Evidence of the immense distance 
traveled by American farming culture can be seen in the fact that John Smith found 
Massachusetts in 1614 to be “so planted with gardens and Come fields” that it amazed 
him (Mann 2002, 49). The original strains of these com plants had been developed 
thousands of miles away in South and Central America.
In 1539, Hemando De Soto, “half-warrior, half venture capitalist,” according to 
Mann (2002, 44), landed at Tampa Bay with 600 soldiers, 200 horses, and 300 pigs.
For four years. De Soto’s disease-carrying army tmdged through what is now the
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American Southeast in search of gold. Although De Soto himself died on the 
expedition, the accounts o f his surviving soldiers record the existence of heavily 
populated large towns and small cities in which many hundreds of native Americans 
lived in close proximity. They also noted wide streets, markets filled with goods from 
hundreds of miles away, and ornately decorated buildings (Mann 2002, 49).
The diseases o f the Spanish took an immense toll on the cities of ancient North 
America. No European visited these parts of the Mississippi valley for more than a 
century afterward, when the French explorers who ventured into the same areas found 
them deserted. Our contemporary perception of early Native Americans as nomadic 
hunters, according to UCLA’s Russell Thornton, was created by the epidemics that 
wiped out these ancient Indian civilizations of North America. (Mann 2002, 45).
The disaster of epidemics wrought by the De Soto, Columbus, Cortez, and other 
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century expeditions left the New World virtually deserted by 
the seventeenth century when the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth. We now know that the 
astounding tales told by De Soto’s troops have been authenticated by archaeological 
findings. For the most part, these findings have come after the deaths of Marx, Weber, 
and Durkheim.
Archaeological discoveries involving the ancient Americas indicate that the 
Westem Hemisphere— like Europe, Asia, and Africa—was traversed by merchants and 
traders apparently acting individually over generations and geographic distances, and 
was typified by levels o f social violence substantially greater than levels experienced in 
westem nations in the twenty-first century. Research at Huexotia in eastem Mexico 
dating to the Aztec period (ca. A.D. 1150-1519) shows that the daily markets contained
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“an astonishing variety of goods and were attended by thousands of people” (Brumfiel 
1980, 460). Great “quantities o f salt, spindle whorls, obsidian, and probably cloth from 
nonlocal sources” (Brumfiel 1980, 460). “By the date of Spanish conquest, market 
exchange had existed in the Valley of Mexico for at least two centuries” (Brumfiel 
1980,460).
Going back even further, evidence of highly-developed market-based 
civilizations have been identified throughout the Westem Hemisphere. “As long as 
people have populated North America, economic incentives have been at work” 
(Barrington 1999a, 4). Textile weaving was as advanced in the Americas 10,000 years 
ago as anywhere in the world (Barrington 1999a). The southwestem Anasazi 
constmcted dams and irrigation canals since at least 1300 A.d. The Cahokia civilization, 
which thrived for hundreds of years before Europeans began to explore North America, 
engaged in an immense trade in flint and copper and had a large network of trade 
routes that criss-crossed the Arkansas, Missouri, and Ohio Rivers (Barrington 1999a). 
By 1000 A.D., the Cahokia had constmcted some of the largest man-made stmctures in 
the world. The Huron maintained trade routes for hundreds of years that extended from 
one end of the Great Lakes to the other (Barrington 1999a, 6). It seems, even, that the 
arrival of Europeans merely integrated with, rather than displaced this trade, and that it 
utilized the same trade routes.
The more we discover about the ancient world, the more complex its patterns of 
exchange and travel become. “We have evidence that the mammoth hunters o f the 
Russian steppes obtained Mediterranean shells in trade, as did also the Cro-Magnon 
hunters o f the central valleys of France” (Heilbroner 1975, 23). Ancient human remains
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with blond hair and Caucasian features have been found far outside Europe in places as 
far removed as China and North America (Bahn 1996, 152). Mummies found in the 
Altai mountains of Russia dating from the last millennium B.C. have been found with 
silk artifacts from as far away as China and Persia (Bahn 1996,151). These 
seemingly bizarre misplacements were at one time seen as fakes or fruits o f faulty 
analysis—but are now considered testaments to a world-crossing commerce o f peoples 
and goods that proceeded contemporary globalization by thousands of years. The past 
is now seen as much more diverse than we once imagined; Caucasian corpses in westem 
China are adomed in the clothing of westem societies, suggesting travel, rather than 
migration or colonization. Archaeologists continue to bump into artifacts and 
specimens that are grossly out o f place according to their previous interpretations of 
human history. Recently-discovered evidence of human habitation on the Yana River 
in Siberia dating to circa 30,000 B.C., for example, shows that human occupation in the 
Arctic is twice as old as previously known (Stewart 2004).
The Evidence From Linguistics 
The research o f linguists confirms the immensity of this prehistoric commerce 
among the earth’s peoples. Word roots common to languages on several continents 
reveal that humans in antiquity are all, in the broadest sense, members o f an immense 
network of intercultural trade and exchange. For example, Sanskrit, the ancient 
language of India, has been shown to be related to Latin and Greek (Rudgley, 35). 
Iranian, Indian, Slavic, Celtic, Germanic, Italic, Greek, Lithuanian and Albanian are all 
branches of the Indo-European language family (Rudgley 35). These languages— and
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others even further removed in west Asia and Africa apparently split off before the 
advent of agriculture (Rudgley 42). A common “Nostratic” language that was the 
mother toungue 10,000 to 15,000 years ago (Rudgley 42). Indeed the seven global 
language etymologies share many basic terms for man, woman, child, hole, vulva, 
finger, and water—words that correspond across hundreds or more languages. As 
Rudgley writes (p. 44), “It seems absolutely remarkable that such correspondences 
should exist across time and space and that languages found as far a field as the deserts 
of southern Africa, the Amazon rain forest, the Arctic and the cities of Europe still 
retain links from a remote time when they were all closely connected” (p. 44). The 
evidence is “striking and is hard to dismiss simply as mere coincidence” (p. 45).
By the Middle Ages, commerce over Europe was so extensive that even the 
tiniest and most isolated town—“a dot on the map without so much as a road to connect 
its few hundred souls to the outer world” was visited by dozens of traders on a monthly 
basis (Heilbroner 1975, 49). '‘[P]rofit-motivated trade extended far beyond the political 
borders of any state and connected . . . [all of these] into a single world system” (Kohl 
1989,227).
Even the world’s oldest fully preserved human body, the “Iceman” found by 
German hikers in the Italian Alps in 1991, was in possession o f garments and tools of 
copper and flint that established the existence of mining and smelting operations of 
some intermediate level (Bahn 1996, 140-145). His hair showed heavy contamination 
with copper and arsenic, which suggested exposure to early industrial copper smelting 
of malachite or azurite ore some 5,300 years ago (145). Precisely where such metals 
were mined and processed remains unknown; however, copper production was heavy
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around the Arabian peninsula during the period (Frank 1993, 394). If the Iceman’s 
tools were forged thereabouts, they traveled the better part of a thousand miles. By 
1500 B.C., métallurgie factories and processing centers had developed over a chain of 
provinces stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic (Frank 1993, 396).
Mining on a huge scale occurred in the Ural Mountains as well as Kazakhstan, 
the Altai Mountains and Russia; two million metric tons of ore was mined and some
100,000 tons of copper was smelted at just two Kazakh sites (Frank 1993, 396). Copper 
ore was systematically transported 300 kilometers through the mountains o f Eurasia; tin 
was traded over a 1,000 kilometer commercial route (Frank 1993, 396). “Caravan 
cities” rose like railroad towns, and the entreprenuers melded widespread differences o f 
culture and language into a common commercial language (Frank 1993, 401).
But this commerce was often at arms length due to the constant threat of violence. 
Spears and shields were the everyday attire of merchants. “Without being armed,” 
wrote Tacitus, “they transact nothing, whether of public or private” (Payne 2004, 30). 
The Ice Man of the Italian Alps mentioned above was initially reported to the world as 
having died mysteriously; initial examinations showed no signs o f violent death (Bahn 
1996, 140). But subsequent X-rays showed the body to have been slain by an arrow 
(“Iceman’s last two meals included big game meat” 2002). Thus, this single human 
specimen refutes two of the major components of the alienation thesis: it exemplifies 
violent death within a commercial theatre some five millennia before the Industrial 
Revolution.
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Factories
Recall that one o f Max Weber’s precepts for distinguishing modem capitalism 
from the markets o f antiquity involved the absence of factories in the latter and their 
presence in the former. But we now know of the existence of many production 
operations in the ancient past o f immense size and output. There were actual factories 
in fifth-century B.C. Babylon that produced and bottled oil in containers for delivery 
throughout three continents (Silver 1983, 812). Archaeologists recently unearthed an 
ancient brewery in southern Pern that operated more than 1,000 years ago. The brewery 
pre-dated the Incan empire by at least four centuries and was capable of producing 
thousands of liters o f beer-like grain alcohol per day for consumption in the region 
(Babwin 2004). Granaries privately owned with no apparent connection to either 
government or religious temples were used by agricultural merchants throughout 
Eurasia before the time of Christ (Silver 1983, 801). Tanning, metal, garment, 
winemaking were all done on massive scales in the second millenium B.C. (Silver 1983, 
811-812). “In what can only be called an industrial revolution,” an iron industry 
flourished in northeast China between 910 and 1126 (Williams 2003, 140). Production 
reached 125,000 to 150,000 tons by AD 1078, a level similar to the total westem and 
Russian European output of the early nineteenth century and only surpassed Great 
Britain in 1796 (Williams 2003, 140).
No one has ever identified a society living or dead whose members engaged in 
no advantageous commerce with others. Foimer American Anthropological 
Association president Emestine Friedl (1978) documented exchanges by members of 
rival primitive hunter-gatherer societies o f goods like flint, salt, and tools. Many
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accounts o f explorers’ first contacts with natives in exotic lands illustrate the 
willingness o f natives to trade services and commodities despite every barrier of 
language and culture. European slave traders began kidnapping Africans for 
enslavement and transportation to the Westem Hemisphere in the 1600s quickly found 
that African entrepreneurs stepped forward to act as middlemen in the industry, saving 
valuable time and effort (Manning 1990). Illiterate natives of West Africa instantly 
adopted capitalism when offered it (Bauer 1954). The African slavers may have 
deposited more prosperity in westem African ports than any industry since.
People with no “capitalistic” traditions are known to become capitalists very 
quickly when the benefits of free markets are weighed against their costs. “There is no 
better way of thoroughly refuting Polanyi’s weeping about the lost glories of “society,” 
wrote Rothbard (2004, 5) than to observe the numberless millions who have chosen the 
way of the market when they had free choice” (Rothbard 2004, 5). “[P]copies all over 
the world, regardless o f cultural tradition, abandon their supposedly beloved culture, in 
order to adopt Westem ways, Westem clothes, get a Westem-type job or serve Westem 
tourists, and eam Westem money—and drink Coca-Cola and go to Hollywood movies, 
as well. It took only a few years, for example, for the people of Japan to abandon their 
thousand-year old traditional culture and folkways to tum eagerly to these supposedly 
decadent market-brought goods of the West” (Rothbard 2004, 5).
When the intemational fur trade exploded in the eighteenth century. Native 
Americans quickly became the major producers in what was one o f the world’s most 
lucrative industries. Indian production o f beaver pelts and deerskins “generated the 
fourth highest export eamings in the British North American colonies on the eve of the
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American Revolution” (Murphy 1999,152). Indians also worked for pay as guides, 
rowers, and frontier laborers in the American backcountry (152). As Carlos and Lewis 
(1999)*recount, Native Americans were central players in these industries rather than 
passive agents in white men’s trade.
Indeed, human progression from hunting and gathering to agriculture can be 
interpreted as a “capitalistic” endeavor. The evidence clearly establishes that farming 
produces more calories than hunting and gathering for each unit of labor invested, 
measured in time or energy (Sillitoe 2002, 454), and individuals who opt to make the 
switch are maximizing profits o f energy and resources. This progression was likely 
produced by the urge to optimize the acquisition o f resources and capital (Sillitoe 2002, 
456).
Summarizing World Economic History
Heilbroner (1975, 53) points out that the famous trade explorers of the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries (e.g., Columbus, Vasco de Gama, Cabral and Magellan) were 
“state adventurers,” commissioned and supplied by kings and queens as their agents. 
Where traders acted privately on their own behalf, they often navigated a treacherous 
landscape o f taxation and predatory regulation by governmental authorities. “Over a 
journey of a hundred miles, a traveling merchant might fall under a dozen different 
sovereignties, each with different rules, regulations, laws, weights, measures, money. 
Worse yet, at each border there was apt to be a toll station” (Heilbroner 1975, 52).
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Authoritarian economic organization The Great Wall of China constructed in 
medieval China, the great public works o f ancient Rome, the Great Pyramid of Cheops 
were all built by command economies (Heilbroner
Summing up the vast literature o f human economic history and development is 
fraught with difficulties. One must conclude, however, that the claims of Weber, Marx, 
and Durkheim that profit-driven trade is a new, westem phenomenon has been 
undermined substantially by the research of the past half-century. At the very least, 
“capitalism” as defined by both Marx and Weber is much older than the theorists 
assumed it to be.
At the same time, it must be conceded that capitalism has grown both in the 
scope, scale, and speed o f transactions, and the dependability and predictability o f 
banking, credit, and purchasing systems. It seems safe to conclude that “capitalism”— 
the free exchange of goods and survives according to private, individual, choice— is 
expanding in most o f the world (Kessler 1973). Free labor “has become the norm in 
much of the world today” (Sowell 2004, 32).
It seems appropriate to concede that the alienation-model theorists were at least 
correct with regard to their overall assessment that human economic exchange has 
generally increased over the centuries. The evidence seems clear that markets that were 
once controlled by state authorities or closed to private enterprise have opened up; that 
cross-global trade has increased in real terms over time, and that private firms 
independent o f state-directed execution have circulated more goods, produced more 
products and exchanged more private wealth as human history has unfolded.
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Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) documented an observable trend in the average 
world trade globalization (measured by world imports versus global GDP) from 1830 to 
1990. Although global trade over these generations exhibited many cyclical peaks and 
valleys, peaks generally rose higher than earlier peaks with each cycle. Similarly, 
Timothy Earle’s prodigious Bronze Age Economics (2002) reconstructs a general trend 
from chiefdoms to centrally-controlled agrarian civilizations to industrialized market 
economies. A “long-term trend of intensification” may be the most descriptive 
conception of this progression (Earle 2002, 322).
Payne’s analysis o f taxation trends supports the view that free markets have 
gradually benefited from lower taxes over the centuries. Rates of taxation were 
extremely high in some comers of the ancient world, inhibiting commerce and causing 
violent revolts that contributed to the deaths o f the Egyptian and Roman empires (Payne 
2004, 200-212). In contrast, rates of taxation have generally declined in most nations 
over the past fifty years.
This conceptual view of capitalism as a growing trend is substantiated, at least in 
recent decades, by figures from Freedom House, which has ranked countries according 
to levels o f capitalism since 1972. Freedom House’s first tabulation in 1972 counted 42 
countries— some 30 percent o f the world’s nations—as “free.” By 2001, 57 countries, 
or 41 percent of the world’s nations, were rated free (Freedom House 2002).
The Freedom House index, established in 1972, evaluates countries according to 
a checklist of questions regarding political rights and civil liberties as outlined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nations are ranked on a scale o f 1 to 7, with 
seven representing the lowest level of freedom and one representing the highest.
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Averages on scales o f political rights and civil liberties are combined to determine 
whether countries are designated Free, Partly Free, or Not Free (Karatnycky 2003).
Since the first annual publication of the Freedom House ratings, the scores have 
tended to show significant gains for freedom around the world. Advances for freedom 
have outpaced reversals by a margin of three to one. “This means that over the last 
thirty years, the number of Free countries has more than doubled; the number o f Partly 
Free states has grown by 17; while the number of the most repressive Not Free states 
has declined by 21. This represents a landmark change in the political landscape o f the 
world” (Karatnycky 2003, 4).
Another index of capitalism, the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index 
kept by the Canadian Fraser Institute, originated in a series of conferences put together 
by Michael Walker and several Nobel Prize winners including Milton Friedman, Gary 
Becker, and Douglas North. The index is currently available for 123 countries, 
measures five key ingredients of economic freedom, including size o f government (as 
measured by expenditures, taxes, and enterprises), legal structure and the protection of 
property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade outside national borders, and 
degree o f credit, labor, and business regulation. A number of other components and 
sub-components are also factored into each country’s index score, so that 38 distinct 
pieces of data The EFW index is generally thought to be superior to the Freedom 
House rankings because it relies on more points o f data and is maintained with greater 
deference to third-party evaluations. However, the EFW is not a perfect measure of 
capitalism.
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CHAPTER 5
MEASURING CAPITALISM 
For more recent years (i.e., since the 1980s), there are published index scores 
measuring levels of capitalism in various nations, as published by economic think tanks 
such as The Fraser Institute, Freedom House, and the Heritage Foundation. Social 
violence will be generally measured by homicide rates, for reasons of expediency and 
necessity. 1 will explain this reliance on homicide data in my methods chapter(s).
The Economic Freedom o f the World report published by Canada’s Fraser 
Institute ranks nations according to criteria measuring the degree to which a nation’s 
institutions and policies promote voluntary exchange, protection of property rights, 
open markets, and minimal regulation o f economic activity. . The Fraser Institute’s 
indexes were designed by Nobel-Prize winning economists like Milton Friedman. The 
first Economic Freedom of the World Report was published in 1996 after a decade of 
research by more than 100 scholars from various fields. The Fraser index uses 38 
variables for each country where available. The top quintile of economically free 
countries have an average score o f 9 or 10 on the United Nation’s Human Development 
index, whereas the bottom quintile least economically free countries have an average 
score of 6 or less. Hong Kong garnered the highest economic freedom rating, followed 
by Singapore, the United States, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
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The data gathered by Miles, Feulner Jr., and O’Grady (2004) also show a 
discernable worldwide trend toward increasing economic liberalization. Their annual 
report. The Index of Economic Freedom, published jointly by the Wall Street Journal 
and the Heritage Foundation, employs 10 factors to measure economic freedom around 
the world. The Index of Economic Freedom (hereafter, the WSJ Index), also scores 
Hong Kong as having “the world’s freest economy” (xi). Also like the EFW index, the 
WSJ index has Europe claiming the largest number of countries in the top 10.
The WSJ index measures how well 161 countries score on a list of 50 
independent variables, with low scores being more desirable. “The higher the score on 
a factor, the greater the level of government interference in the economy and the less 
economic freedom a country enjoys” (p.l). Hong Kong and Singapore lead the world 
according to the index because of their good investment climate characterized hy strong 
property rights (p. 2). Europe claims six of the 10 freest countries. The authors note 
that European countries have recently reduced their fiscal burdens by privatizing 
industries, lowering taxes and tariffs, and contracting out for government services.
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CHAPTER 6
MEASURING VIOLENCE WORLDWIDE
Measuring capitalism may be the easy part. Measuring the second component 
of the alienation model, violence, turns out to be at least equally difficult. Attempting 
to measure and compare violence across world jurisdictions over time poses “a veritable 
methodological quicksand” (Archer and Gartner 1984, 10) due to varying standards of 
violence and criminality around the world. World jurisdictions vary tremendously in 
the ways they define, record, and act upon different behaviors of the same crime lahel 
(Archer and Gartner 1984). Different societies employ different indicators of basic 
crime categories. Some countries measure homicide by offenses known, some by 
arrests, some by court cases, some by convictions, and some by incarcerations (Archer 
and Gartner 1984).
International institutions that systematically collect a wide variety and depth of 
data about the world’s nations do not systematically collect even the most basic crime 
data in a standardized form. It appears that the United Nations (UN) may have 
attempted to collect such data at different times, hut that its member nations have 
objected or sought to suppress the publication of this data (Archer and Gartner 1984, 
20). Political sensitivity may explain this recalcitrance (Archer and Gartner 1984, 21).
Interpol collects annual submissions of crime data by member nations, but its 
records are often discontinuous and inconsistent in their standards (Archer and Gartner
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1984, 18). “The murder category excludes ‘accidental manslaughter’ in 1953, but by 
1969 it excludes all ‘manslaughter’” (Archer and Gartner 1984, 18). Even where 
“homicide” data are reported, they often represent varying measurements.
During the 1970s, sociologists Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner (1984) 
undertook an ambitious study to obtain crime reports from 110 nations covering the 
years 1900 to 1970. They established a data set entitled the Comparative Crime Data 
File (CCDF) which was published in the mid 1980s. The CCDF data set is 
discontinuous and widely varying. Nations vary in the ways they define and record 
behaviors. Homicide can include (1) first and second-degree murder, (2) manslaughter, 
meaning “unintentional” or negligent homicide.
The Peculiar Case Of The United States 
The inquiry into a capitalism-homicide relationship suffers from the 
overrepresentation of data and insights from the United States. “An undesirably large 
part o f existing research on crime and violence is grounded in [this] single case”
(Archer and Gartner 1984, 5). This emphasis on the United States for data on crime and 
violence has major implications to the overall trajectory of research into alienation, and 
to this study. Western scholars have suffered from “America bias”— a tendency to view 
homicide and economic relationships within the United States as unrealistically 
representative o f world trends. The basis for this bias is the lack o f systematic research 
on homicide in other nations (Archer and Gartner 1984).
And the United States represents an extreme outlier: it is both extremely high on 
every index o f economic freedom but also produces relatively high rates of homicide.
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American social scientists who have suggested the existence o f a capitalism-violence 
relationship have had only to point to their own country for anecdotal evidence 
supporting the existence of a relationship. Yet without a rigorous cross-national 
comparison, the generality of this proposition cannot be ascertained (Archer and 
Gartner 1984).
The Failure Of Previous Methods
The failure o f social science to accurately account for violence in nowestem 
societies has only come to light during the last two decades. This failure is most 
profound with regard to simple, so-called Third-World societies. Ethnographic 
researchers from the field of anthropology have skewed the picture of violence among 
simple societies for generations. Ever since the days o f Marx and Weber, many social 
scientists have internalized the vision of primitive man as a “noble savage.” As 
Edgerton (1992) writes, anthropologists in the field who carry such “Rousseauist 
illusions” tend to dismiss evidence o f disharmony, jealousy, and violence as the 
products of contact with “colonial officials, soldiers, missionaries, or traders” (8).
Anthropologist Robert B. Edgerton concluded that “it is likely that the 
ethnographic record substantially underreports the amount and kind of human suffering 
and discontent that has actually existed in the world’s small societies” (5). Many 
ethnographies are “idealized, even romanticized portraits.” For example, Jane Belo 
described the Balinese as a society in which babies did not cry, small boys did not fight, 
and everyone behaved politely and respectfully—claims discredited hy descriptions in 
the same text if  not by other sources (5). Robert Redfield described the Mexican village
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o f Tepoztlaiî as tranquil and content, but his own student Oscar Lewis described the 
same society as filled with malice, distrust, hatred, and fear (5-6).
Elizabeth Marshall Thomas’s book The Harmless People, about the Kalahari 
Bushmen was later exposed as providing a one-sided, overly sympathetic image of 
Kalahari life: later research revealed the Kalahari to produce very high homicide rates 
(6). Colin M. Trunbull’s The Forest People, “probably the most widely read 
ethnography ever written” (Edgerton 1992, 6), described Zaire’s Mhuti tribesmen as a 
society without homicide, suicide or rape, and without war. This ethnography, in print 
continuously since 1961 and still prescribed reading in anthropology classes worldwide, 
depicts a “prototype o f a folk society” (Edgerton 6). Just as with other primitive 
ethnographies o f the mid-twentieth century, however. The Forest People proved to be a 
romanticized yam with regard to its depictions of tribal harmony (Edgerton 1992, 6).
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CHAPTER 7
VIOLENCE IN DECLINE 
Calculating historical national homicide rates without standardized reporting 
criteria within each U.S. state may ultimately be an act of speculation. Even today, 
regional norms of violence are so diverse that it might be more accurate to speak of 
America’s homicide rates in the plural sense. Louisiana, for example, had a 1997 
homicide rate of 15.7 per hundred thousand population while South Dakota had a rate 
11 times lower, only 1.4 per hundred thousand. From such a diversity, it seems almost 
misleading to say that the United States has a unified homicide rate today.
The same is even more true for generations past. While seventeenth-century 
Virginia was a violent and disorderly place, the Massachusetts Bay Colony was not; 
although the South and the western frontier experienced very high levels o f violence, 
rural New England and Mormon Utah were recognized for their social tranquility 
(Courtwright 1998, 3). Computing a national homicide rate for a given historical 
period, therefore, seems unduly difficult. We have rough figures for only a sparse 
cross-section of locales for the nineteenth century, and eighteenth-century homicides 
are even harder to count.
Scholars of violence disagree, however, over whether interpersonal violence has 
increased or declined over time. Rates of violent crime in the United States have been 
recorded with something approaching systematic order only since the 1950s (Lane
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1997). Social scientists and historians can be said to be in disagreement over the nature, 
prevalence, and scope of social violence prior to the twentieth century. Stacks of 
scholarly books obtainable from any large library promote rival positions {compare 
Chasinl995; Montagu 1968 with Payne 2004; Kealey 1998). Articles in the most 
prominent sociology and criminology journals come to competing conclusions.
The question of how rates of interpersonal violence have changed over history 
has heen frequently revisited by sociologists and historians (Brearly, 1931; Chesnais, 
1992; Lane, 1997). In 1969, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of 
Violence, under the auspices of presidential authority, compiled studies hy a number of 
historians and scholars on trends in American violence (Graham and Gurr, 1969). The 
background for the study was the urhan and campus rioting of the 1960s, and 
policymakers expected clear evidence o f historic upward trends in violence. The 
historians came to no compelling consensus, however. A general conclusion was that 
American rates of violence have always been substantially higher than those of other 
western societies, and that overall violence had actually declined slowly as the United 
States matured.
A more recent treatise by Roger Lane (1997) concluded that the America of the 
1990s was probably less violent than the America o f the year 1900, which was in turn 
probably less violent than the America o f 1800. Lane found that American rates of 
violent killings fell by about a third in cities like Philadelphia between the early 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries (p. 185), a phenomenon attributable to the 
work habits engendered by the industrial revolution and an increasingly sober and 
educated population (p. 183-185).
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Reports of violence and crime have taken up an increasing proportion of 
American news coverage during the past two decades (Glassner, 1999). But as Ted 
Chicicos (1998) and others have shown, fear of crime has no relationship to the 
incidence of crime. In fact, news media coverage of crime has generated a spiraling 
effect among media consumers. Fear of crime and violence has been found to be more 
closely related to modem news exposure than to real experiences.'^ Those who express 
the highest levels o f fear o f violence have rarely suffered from such violence.'^ The 
public’s perception o f an increase in violent crime in spite o f the declining crime rates 
during the 1990s (Shichor 2000, 8).
This erroneous picture of chaos and disorder painted by social commentators 
brought about radical changes in American society throughout the 1980s and ‘90s. Zero 
tolerance policies in schools and playgrounds and mandatory arrest laws have been 
enacted by policymakers to quell the alleged crisis o f violence facing American society. 
Average criminal sentences for violent crimes more than doubled between the 1970s 
and 2000.
Growth in American regulatory culture has also had an impact on rates of 
violence. The United States was founded in an era when professional police forces 
were unheard of, and law enforcement was the duty of the common citizen (Roots, 
2001). “With every passing decade,” however, “the police advantage grew” (Lane, 
1997, p. 182). By the late nineteenth century, police held such firm control over private 
violence that it had become almost unthinkable for individuals to prevail against them 
(Lane, 1997, p. 182-183). As America’s history has progressed, its laws have been
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more stringently enforced by police, its prosecutors have let fewer suspects go, and its 
juries have been increasingly likely to convict (Lane, 1997, p. 194-195).
Under zero tolerance policies, students who commit even minor acts o f violence 
or possess any type o f weapon are excluded from institutions. Toy guns, butter knives 
to cut bread, nail files, swiss army knife key chains, shooting paper clips with rubber 
bands, or vaving two spent firecrackers in a pocket have all resulted in suspension or 
expulsion. Bringing the medication Midol to school to alleviate menstrual cramps, 
sharing lemon cough drops, tasting Alka-Seltzer, possessing Tylenol have also led to 
suspensions for “drug-related” infractions. A student who wrote an essay for 
Halloween with violent overtures was not only expelled but jailed in Texas. In 
Sayreville, New Jersey, four kindergartners suspected of pointing their fingers at other 
students and pretending to shoot them were reprimanded. A 15-year-old Chicago 
student who brought an elaborately carved cane to show-and-tell was expelled for 
bringing a weapon to school. A 15-year-old Tulsa, Oklahoma girl was suspended for 
putting a hex on a teacher.
The irony is that Zero Tolerance, a product o f the most peaceful period in 
American history. Chicago expulsions jumped from 21 in 1994-95 to 668 in 1997-98, 
an increase of 3,000 percent. In Massachusetts, there were 90 expulsions in 1992-93, 
but now expels approximately 1500 students each year. Chicago actually had to 
establish a special school for expelled students in 1998. There has also been a major 
shifts toward use of psychiatric drugs. Millions o f children are already on Ritalin, and 
hundereds of thousands are under other medications. Prozac, ironically, this forced 
medicating, creates “potted plant syndrome” according to Professor Ferris.
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Driven by rising public fear of violence, public health officials declared violence 
to be a national public health threat during the 1980s and 1990s (Gilligan, 1996; 
Moynihan, 1993).'* In 1983, a ‘Violence Epidemiology Branch’ was created at the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). During 1999, the Branch was 
involved in research activities such as the reduction o f injuries from firearms, school 
violence prevention, and reduction o f suicide (Potter & Saltzman, 2000, p. 1, 4). The 
June 10, 1992 issue of the Journal o f  the American Medical Association was devoted 
entirely to the subject o f violence and included an editorial cosigned by United States 
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop entitled “Violence in America: A Public Health 
Emergency” (Moynihan, p. 1993).
Even when empirical evidence indicates violent crime is on the decline, 
politicians and public officials often paint violence as a growing threat. U.S. Attorney 
General Janet Reno told one audience during the mid-1990s that “no comer o f America 
is safe fi-om increasing levels of criminal violence.” “Parents are afraid to let their 
children walk to school alone. Children hesitate to play in neighborhood playgrounds. 
The elderly lock themselves in their homes, and innocent Americans of all ages find 
their lives changed by the fear o f crime” (Greenhaum, 1997, 136). Former President 
Richard Nixon, in his 1994 book Beyond Peace, grieved that liberal judges and lawyers 
had brought on a “fearful increase in violent crime” (Nixon, 1994, p. 231).
“Having reviewed the sociology of violence, we believe we have made a strong 
case that our society has become organized around unresolved, multigenerational 
traumatic experience” (Bloom and Reichert 1998, 99). The pervasive violence inherent 
in American society creates a “robopathology” a state o f deep and pervasive alienation
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in which values are “grounded in material possessions, rather than in feelings, social 
welfare, mercy, love, or peace” (Bloom and Reichert 1998, 93).
It is noteworthy that the American Sociological Association has also endorsed 
the view that violence has become so prevalent that only a public health mobilization 
can deal with it effectively. “Beyond the criminal justice and mental health systems, 
public health institutions most directly deal with violence on a day-to-day basis. The 
enormous burden placed on emergency room and rehabilitation facilities from gun 
injuries alone has made violence a major public health problem and a crucial arena for 
further study” (Levine and Rosich 1996, 64).
Reconstructing Violence Rates From Anecdotal Evidence
For the most part, trends in violence prior to 1900 must be reconstructed from 
anecdotal evidence. The violence historian becomes an estimator rather than a 
measurer. However, recordings of assessments and reflections regarding violence are 
by no means difficult to find. Commentators from Tocqueville to Dickens published 
their observations of the prevalence of violence around them and many literate 
laypersons likewise noted their perceptions o f the violence around them in diaries and 
journals.
And the picture painted by writers of the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries 
depict a social landscape ridden with excessive violence. For much of American 
history, violence has been a part of everyday life. Both parents and teachers used 
corporal punishment routinely until quite recently (Siegel 1995, 2126). Even soldiers, 
prisoners, and sailors were routinely disciplined with whips and clubs throughout most
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of American history (Siegel, 1995,2125-26 n.26-27). Misdemeanor offenses in the 
nineteenth century had to be dealt with by the private citizen on his own terms. “The 
farther hack the [crime rate] figures go,” according to Lane (1968), “the higher is the 
relative proportion of serious crimes” (Lane, 1968, p. 452). Many common acts of 
criminal violence in such times were never reported to the agents of the law, as “those 
affected either shrugged off their injuries or struck back directly” (Lane 1968, 450). 
British forensic psychiatrist John Gunn (1973) pointed to interviews o f older police 
officers who said that a considerable amount o f violent behavior was taken for granted 
and not reported and recorded in earlier times, as it would be today. Saturday night 
brawls and knife fights, once overlooked in crime statistics, became more uniformly 
recorded as the twentieth century wore on (Gunn, 1973, p. 130).
Anecdotes from Europe establish similar horrors from previous centuries. 
French historians have observed that personal brutality and crimes o f violence 
were strikingly common in medieval times. . . .  In Russia, historian Alex de 
Jonge notes that “Seventeenth-century Moscow was an extraordinarily violent 
city. Robbery and murder were commonplace, and every morning there would 
be a fresh hatch o f corpses to be found and laid out in the streets.” He quotes a 
contemporary source who reported that “No night passes without a murder” and 
that the number o f murders could reach as high as 15 in one night (Payne 2004,
185).
British emissary William Crawford, who undertook a systematic study of 
American criminal justice in the 1830s, concluded that many brutal slayings went 
totally unnoticed “in a legal sense” (Crawford, 1834, 26).
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Crimes are of course matters o f frequent occurrence, and ye t . . .  the 
discrepancies between the number o f commitments and the actual 
extent of crime, in the more western as well as the southern States, 
merit peculiar attention. There exists in those parts of the country a 
great recklessness o f human life. Personal insult is resented by the 
immediate gratification o f revenge. A custom prevails of carrying 
pocket pistols, or of wearing a dirk in the bosom, while scarcely any of 
the labouring classes are without a large clasped knife, which, opening 
with a spring, becomes a truly formidable weapon. Hence assaults of 
the most desperate character in the public streets frequently occur, and 
death to the parties often ensues. Prosecutions, however, arising out of 
these acts of violence, are by no means common (Crawford, 26).
Murder Rates In American History
The murder rates of contemporary American cities pale in comparison to those 
experienced in transient communities o f the western United States during the gold rush. 
The small mining town of Bodie, Colorado, for example, experienced 29 killings 
between 1877 and 1883, giving it a statistical homicide rate almost four times higher 
than modem crime capitols like Atlanta and Miami at the peak of their homicide rates in 
the late 1980s. (White 1991, 331). Larger cities, especially those with substantial 
migrant populations, also had higher crime rates than we know today, although exact 
figures are in many cases difficult to obtain. San Francisco, for example, experienced
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more murders in one year in the late 1880s with a population of around 30,000 to 
35,000 people, than in the late 1980s with a population of 700,000 (Miller, 1994, p. 12). 
The Los Angeles riots received tremendous exposure in 1992, but they pale in 
comparison to the draft riots in new York City in the mid 1800s (id.).
Since national crime statistics are dependent upon local data, regional 
differences in categorizing and crime recording make generalized interpretations 
difficult. Alterations in the tabulation of New York crime statistics, for instance, led to 
a 72 percent increase in 1966 in the official records (Guis 96). Another prominent crime 
researcher complained as recently as 1996 that “[hjomicide is the only crime [the 
official FBI Crime Report] measures accurately enough to make cross-jurisdictional 
comparisons” (Neuman & Wiegand, 2000, 132).
Homicide as a Measure of Overall Violence
Due to these problems with measuring (or even precisely defining) “violence” 
on a general basis, violence scholars have often used homicide rates as rough substitute 
measures of over-all social violence (Caplow, Hicks, and Wattenherg 2001, 214).'^ 
Most students of violence are familiar with graphs charting homicide rates in the U.S. 
from 1900 to 2000. These graphs show that homicide rates peaked at highs o f greater 
than nine per hundred thousand persons on and off during the 1980s and early 1990s 
and also during the early 1930s. Although rates o f homicide have subsequently 
declined to around 5.8, they are still higher than rates from earlier in the twentieth 
century.
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Murder, unlike other categories o f violence, is “relatively immune” to 
underreporting (Archer and Gartner 1984, 35). Within western nations, there are strong 
reasons to believe that homicide is fully counted in national crime statistics. A 
presidential crime commission concluded that homicide is “an especially valid indicator 
because it appeared to be invulnerable to police misclassification” (Archer and Gartner 
1984, 35 (citing Mulvihill and Tumin 1969)). Homicide also appears to be “relatively 
invariant in definition and tabulation” (Archer and Gartner 1984, 35). The combination 
o f these factors make homicide data a valid basis for comparative research on hoth 
trends and levels of violent crime (Archer and Gartner 1984).
Homicide Rates Before 1900 
Expanding the graph to apply to earlier generations is exceedingly difficult. The 
twentieth century was “the first measured century,” and previous generations had no 
traditions o f counting and measuring social conditions (Caplow, Hicks, & Wattenherg, 
2001). Crime itself is a phenomenon whose records were not systematically kept until 
at least the second quarter of the twentieth century (Lane, 1997: 307).^° “Before 1900, 
there are no national figures at all,” and the regional records that are available are a 
“potpourri of arrests, indictments, imprisonments, and executions, with a few runs of 
coroners’ reports . . . not easily comparable to each other [across jurisdictions, and] 
rarely span many years or decades in any given township, county, city, or state” (Lane, 
1997: 309). “Above all they undercount, to some unknown degree, the number of 
killings actually committed” (309).
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Infanticide
Accounts o f crimes against children in the distant past make today’s child abuse 
rates seem incredibly mild in comparison. Most societies at one time systematically 
killed a substantial proportion of female infants—sometimes by selective neglect, but 
often by smothering or abandonment. This form of murder, known as infanticide, was 
prevalent in Europe until fairly recently. In 1835, the French government recorded the 
abandonment o f more than 150,000 infants. In Britain it was not uncommon in the 
eighteenth century to find the corpses o f bahies lying on dungheeps or in the streets. 
(Stark, 340). Nor were Americans immune from the tendency to murder or abandon 
infants rather than care for them:
Through the 1850s no record was kept of “dead infants found” in 
vacant lots, privies, and gutters, but at times during the following 
decade the reported annual total for Philadelphia reached about one 
every other day. In addition to these, thousands were reported each 
year as stillhom, or having died either of suffocation or of a number of 
other causes impossible for the medical science o f the day to 
distinguish from strangulation . . . (Lane, 1997, 119).
Conflicting Assessments O f Violence Authorities 
Nothing demonstrates the difficulty o f assessing rates of homicide from 
historical anecdotes like the disagreements o f noted scholars. The great criminologist 
Cesare Lomhroso, writing before the turn of the twentieth century, found the United
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States between the 1860s and the 1890s to exhibit a level of lawlessness that had “no 
equal in the rest of the world.” Lomhroso’s statistics purported to show that crime rates 
rose 445 percent while the U.S. population rose 170 percent during the period (Bettman, 
1974, p. 87). Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, editors o f American Violence: A 
Documentary History, regard the Reconstruction era as “the bloodiest period of 
American civil violence, as whites acted to reverse their military defeat” (1970, 223). 
But according to Roger Lane, one of the foremost authorities on the history of 
American murder rates, the antebellum years o f 1830 to the 1840s were “the most 
disorderly and hloodiest in our history” (Lane, 1997, 92):
European travelers to Georgia or Tennessee brought hack gory 
accounts o f the number of men whose ears or noses had heen bitten off, 
or eyes gouged out, in tavern brawls. These fights, if  conducted 
“fairly,” were considered a form of purely private recreation, carried on 
without official interference from the few extant officials o f law 
enforcement. In Richmond, during its frontier stage, there were no 
prosecutions for assault; it was not done to call the sheriff (Lane, 1997,
86).
The disagreements between scholars regarding the prevalence o f violence in the past 
shows that reconstructing homicide rates from anecdotal writings is accomplished only 
with great speculation.
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James L. Payne (2004,184) cites a study of 13"’-century European court records 
that suggest an average homicide rates around 19 deaths per 100,000 population per 
year. “Because this 13''’-century figure is based on court trials, not reported homicides, 
it almost certainly understates the homicide rate o f the time” (p. 184). Payne also 
identifies a homicide rate of 110 per 100,000 in Oxford in the 1340s, a rate 
approximately 100 times the modem rate in England (2004, 184). Rome and other 
Italian cities had a homicide rate o f about 180 per 100,000 in the eighteenth century 
(Payne 2004,184). This rate is more than thirty times greater than contemporary 
American rates.
When the trends for all the studies are combined, they show that the 
homicide rate declined from about 20 in the 1200s to about 10 in the 
1500s, and then to 1-2 in the modem period, that is, since 1860. From 
the evidence, it is clear, as historian Michael MacDonald puts it, that 
“seventeenth-century villages bore no relation to the peaceable 
kingdoms anxious urbanites imagine made up ‘the world we have lost;’ 
hatred, fear and violence were endemic in mral England before the 
Industrial Revolution” (Payne 2004, 184).
Going back further, violence becomes only one of multiple strands of constant human 
miseries that humanity had to contend with. As Payne (2002) writes, for “some forty 
centuries o f history spanning tens of thousands o f tribes, kingdoms, and empires around
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the world, virtually all of the information about violence over all this time and in all 
these places has been lost or was never recorded (448):
What little we know about the past reveals that it was appallingly bloody.
Start, if  you like, with the Bihle, which reports in the book o f Joshua that 
the Hebrew conquest of the Holy Land was a systematic program of God- 
ordained genocide, an extermination of every man, woman, and child in 
each conquered city. Turn your attention to China, and you will find a 
history of stupendous civil wars, each costing millions of lives, as one can 
estimate from the abrupt declines in population following the upheavals.
For example, as a result of the fighting and massacres o f the Nanking revolt 
in 1853-64, the population of the province fell by 70 percent (Payne 2002,
449).
Violence In Early Myth And Texts 
If man’s earliest writings are replete with references to trade and commerce, 
they abound with accounts of violence. The Palette of Narmer, from Hierakonpolis, 
Upper Egypt— sometimes described as “the first page of the first chapter of the written 
history of Egypt”— depicts a powerful king smiting a kneeling victim with a blow to the 
head (Rudgley 1999). Every known society’s founding myths emphasize violent death, 
violent war, and violent conflict.
Most readers o f the Bible are struck by the ubiquity and savagery of violence 
recorded in it. A number of facts become clear to any reader o f The Bible: both the
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ubiquity o f commerce and the ubiquity of violence in the world of its authors. From 
Genesis to Revelations, The Bible provides a history of middle-eastern warfare in the 
theatre of commercial trade.
Ultimately, we are left with little more than archeological evidence, for indicia 
of homicide rates in human antiquity. Even the fossil record reveals scrapes, scalpings 
that can only be attributed to aggression by one person against another.
Domestic Violence
Claims that violence is on the increase are often made within the context of 
domestic violence. Family violence scholars like Felder and Victor (1996) have 
referred to “the increasingly widespread problem of domestic violence” (p. 39). “There 
is a war heing waged on women in America,” according to Felder and Victor (1996).
Despite such proclamations, studies of family violence indicate that the actual 
incidence of such violence has declined markedly over three decades. Historically, 
minor violence in the home was so universal that it rarely captured the public’s 
attention. Minor spousal beating was considered a prerogative of spouses under 
American law until the mid-1800s (Siegel, 1996, p. 2125). Later, the law changed to 
deny husbands the privilege of beating their wives, hut granted them immunity from 
prosecution for wife-beating under marital privacy rationales (Siegel, p. 2120). Only in 
the 1970s and ‘80s did spousal violence come to be a real concern of the criminal 
justice system.
Evidence indicates that the increased prevalence of domestic violence and child 
abuse among violent crime statistics is almost certainly an example of better crime
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reporting rather than real changes in crime (Gelles & Strauss, 1988). Before the 1970s, 
signs o f hattery on small children were rarely reported, whereas increased public 
recognition o f domestic violence has made the reported figures leap up. (Gunn, 139). 
The probable reality is that violence by intimates has declined markedly in a quarter- 
century. In 1996, intimates committed 36 percent fewer murders than in 1976 (Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, 1998). Spouse murder, the largest component o f intimate murder, 
declined by 52 percent in the same period {id.). Gelles and Straus (1988) documented a 
substantial drop in projected domestic violence between 1975 and 1986. They 
attributed this drop not to new formal (criminal justice) constraints but to lower social 
tolerance for wife batterers.
It is also known that accounts of crimes against children in the distant past make 
today’s child abuse rates seem incredibly mild in comparison. Most societies at one 
time systematically killed a substantial proportion of female infants—sometimes by 
selective neglect, but often by smothering or abandonment. This infanticide was 
prevalent in Europe until fairly recently. In 1835, the French government recorded the 
abandonment of more than 150,000 infants. In Britain it was not uncommon in the 
eighteenth century to find the corpses of babies lying on dungheeps or in the streets. 
(Stark, 340).
The reality is that men have approved of wife beating in virtually every pre­
industrial society (Edgerton 1992, 81). In many such societies, choice, desirable foods 
were denied to women simply because men reserved them for themselves. In his 
review of food tahoos, Frederick Simoons reported that after women among the 
Chukchee of Siberia had done all the work of slaughtering, butchering , and cooking
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reindeer, Chukchee men ate their fill, leaving only scraps and bones for the women. 
These men left no doubt about how they felt when they said, “Being women, eat 
crumhs.” The Chukchee were hardly unique. Peter Freuchen observed that for the 
Hudson Bay Inuit, hoiled meat was “man’s food, too good for women to have.” 
Similarly, in many parts of aboriginal Australia, women were not allowed access to 
food that men were especially fond of : instead, the men ate alone, then “threw” what 
they could not eat to the women (Edgerton 1992, 81-82).^'
Thus, the observations o f other types of violence seem applicable to domestic 
violence. As American sensitivity to domestic violence has grown, so have popular 
restatements of its severity increased, and so has its actual incidence declined.
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CHAPTER 8
OVERALL TRENDS IN AMERICAN VIOLENCE 
Crime statistics demonstrate that contemporary life in the United States is now 
less violent than ever measured before. Violent crime in general plummeted 27 percent 
between 1993 and 1998. Nonfatal violent crime has never been so low since the Justice 
Department began tracking the data in 1973 (Grier, 1999, p. 4). Homicide rates in the 
American workplace are possibly at an all-time low, with a decline of 46 percent of 
robbery-related homicides registered between 1994 and 1998 (Providence Journal, Aug. 
5, 1999). The homicide rate has recently declined to a mere 6.3 per 100,000, lower than 
at any time since the late 1960s (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000).
Indeed, America has become so safe from violence that the risk of accidental 
death has increased substantially in comparison. 31 percent more Americans died from 
falling in 1999 than in 1992 (Wald, 2000). Accidental poisonings increased by 48 
percent in the same period. Also during the same period, 29 percent fewer Americans 
died from firearms accidents in 1999 than a decade earlier. Much of this growth in 
accidental death rates is attributed to an increase in numbers of elderly people prone to 
falls and drug overdoses (Wald, 2000).
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Payne’s History Of Force 
James L. Payne’s A History o f Force (2004) suggested that the underlying 
course of human history was away from violence and toward more peaceful resolutions 
of social conflict. “As far as we can tell from the historical record, we live in a much 
more peaceful world than has ever existed,” Payne wrote (p. 7). Claims to the contrary, 
he asserted, were attributable to a trio of culprits: “the fallacy of presentism” (the well- 
reeognized tendency to believe that our own time is special or important), the bias of 
interest groups (including politicians and police officials) with stakes in the promotion 
of the alienation thesis, and sampling bias by the media (p. 8).
The fallacy of presentism appears to distort the judgment of every observer. 
Edward Gibbon, author o f the Decline and Fall o f  the Roman Empire, remarked that 
people universally tend to “exalt the past and depreciate the present” (Kilpatrick 2003). 
Even learned historians make the mistake of assuming “that events of the present are 
larger, more important, or more shocking than events of the past” (Payne 2004, 8). 
Irving Louis Horowitz described it as “an assumption that the period they are living 
through is somehow more fragile than any other, filled with tragedies not before felt, 
and accomplishments not before realized” (Horowitz 1977, 115).
Nearly every human generation has believed itself enveloped in a mushrooming 
surge of violence and crime. The majority of Englishmen in the nineteenth century, 
according to British criminologist J.S. Cockbum, “were convinced that crime was 
increasing as never before.” “[T]he authors of the eighteenth century, likewise, were 
terrified at what they considered to be the advent of a wave of violent crime.” (Chesnais 
1992,233X
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This current-time-and-place bias has followed American pop-criminology into 
its present era (e.g., Bloom and Reichert 1998; Pro throw-Stith 1991). Even during the 
mid-1990s, when empirical evidence indicated violent crime was on the decline, 
politicians and public officials painted violence as a growing threat. “[N]o comer of 
America is safe from increasing levels of criminal violence,” said Attorney General 
Janet Reno during a speech in the mid-1990s. “Parents are afraid to let their children 
walk to school alone. Children hesitate to play in neighborhood playgrounds. The 
elderly lock themselves in their homes, and innocent Americans o f all ages find their 
lives changed by the fear of crime” (Greenbaum, 1997, 136). Richard Nixon, in his 
final book, lamented that liberal judges o f the 1960s and ‘70s had brought about a 
“fearful increase in violent crime” in the 1990s (Nixon, 1994, p. 231). Even academics 
have fallen for this temptation to paint violence as “increasingly widespread” (Felder 
and Victor 1996, 39).
The Decline O f War 
But what about wars and other forms of collective violence? Again, the 
evidence indicates that military conflicts around the world are claiming fewer and fewer 
lives. Payne (2004, 15) notes that the rate o f killing in wars is now less than l/lOO'*’ the 
pace o f a century ago. The deadliest known war in North American history on a per 
capita basis was King Philips War in 1675-76, when approximately one-fourth of all 
participants lost their lives. The French and Indian War, the Revolutionary War, and 
the Civil War also produced extremely high proportionate casualty counts. But not
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since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has there been a military exchange of any 
scope in North America.
The Difficulty O f Compiling Historical Crime Figures 
Official crime figures from America’s past tell very little of the whole story of 
American crime. Since national crime statistics are dependent upon regional data, 
differences in categorizing and crime recording make generalized interpretations 
difficult. Alterations in the tabulation of New York crime statistics, for instance, led to 
a 72 percent increase in 1966 in the official state records. (Guis, 96). Even at the turn of 
the twenty-first century, “[hjomicide is the only crime [the official FBI Crime Reports] 
measures accurately enough to make cross-jurisdictional comparisons (Neuman & 
Wiegand, 2000,132)."
In general, formal criminal justice institutions of past generations dealt only with 
the most severe crimes. Criminal justice in the nineteenth century concentrated on the 
more important prisonable offenses, “to the neglect of others, even indictable ones’’ 
(Lane, 1968). Many common acts of criminal violence in such times were never 
reported to the agents of the law, as “those affected either shrugged off their injuries or 
struck back directly’’ (id., 450).
Misdemeanor offenses in the nineteenth century had to be dealt with by the 
private citizen on the private citizen’s own terms. “The farther back the [crime rate] 
figures go," according to historian Roger Lane, “the higher is the relative proportion of 
serious crimes” (Lane, 1968, 452). In other words, before the advent of professional 
police, fewer crimes— only the most serious crimes—were brought to the attention of the
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courts. Professional police have thus helped spread the onus of criminality over larger 
masses of the population.
British forensic psychiatrist John Gunn (1973) argues that the prevalence of 
crime dropped substantially in both Britain and the United States over the course of the 
twentieth century. Any increase in the official figures reflects only a decreased 
tolerance o f crime, according to Gunn. Gunn points to interviews of older police 
officers who said that a considerable amount o f violent behavior was taken for granted 
in the past and not reported and recorded, as it would be today. Saturday night brawls 
and knife fights, once overlooked in crime statistics, now are more uniformly recorded. 
(Gunn, 130).
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CHAPTER 9
AMERICAN VIOLENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
American society is not only much safer now than in the past, it is also much 
safer than many societies of the present. In such places as Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador 
(all scoring quite low on indexes o f capitalism), murder is the prime eause o f death 
among young male adults. Among the native populations o f Venezuela, nearly half of 
all males over 25 have participated in a killing. Data from central African countries is 
difficult to come by but probably demonstrates similar rates (Chesnais, 219). Private 
firearm ownership is extremely rare in eaeh of these societies.
Modem commentators often decry the too-frequent use by juveniles of firearms 
to resolve conflicts. “Disputes that would previously have ended in fist fights,” 
aeeording to Stuart Greenbaum (1997), “are now more likely to lead to shootings.”
Yet this argument loses support when considered in historical context. In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, dueling with pistols was considered a standard rite 
o f passage for young men in both America and Europe. Between 1819 and 1826, more 
than 800 young men were killed in duels in the French army alone in a seven year 
period. The vast majority of such duels were over petty grievances and trivial rivalries 
(Chesnais, 224).
In antebellum Virginia, violence between students was so common that students 
routinely went armed to defend themselves from attack. “Challenges are continually
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passing; fights are had almost every day,” wrote one student to his parents. Another 
student assured his faculty that the bowie knife he carried was intended only for use 
“against a person who should insult him and refuse to give him honorable satisfaction” 
Ayers, 1991, 103-04).
The modem reality is that youth homicide rates have declined by 30 percent in 
recent years and more than three times as many people die from being stmek by 
lightning than by violence at schools (Glassner, 1999, xv). Schools are generally safer 
at school among other students than outside of school.
Firearm Violence
Much of the scholarship about violence involves firearms and the impact of 
firearms on American life. The United States does indeed have rates of firearm deaths 
higher than many industrialized nations. However, the rate o f actual exposure to 
firearm violence may be somewhat exaggerated. Firearm deaths declined nine percent 
between 1990 and 1996 (USA Today, 1999, Al).
More than half of all firearm deaths every year are suicides, which are 
preventable by the victim. The 13,000 or so annual firearm homicides in the United 
States represents less than half o f the number o f Americans who die annually from 
occupational hazards and disease (Reiman, 1999, 80) and less than even the number of 
Americans who die prematurely from medical malpractice (id.). Firearm homicides 
also pale in comparison to the 400,000 Americans who die from tobacco (id., 84) and 
the 50,000 Americans who die from traffic accidents every year.
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Even the modem shibboleth o f the “drive-by shooting” is nothing new. Such 
acts were quite common in America during prohibition and even led Congress to place 
regulations on machine guns in the 1930s. Just as the much less capable semi­
automatic “assault weapons” have been targeted for regulation as “the gun o f choice for 
drug dealers and street gangs.” (Ferris, 162).
Never before have so many armed people lived as safely as now in the United 
States. America with its 200 million privately-held firearms is much safer— 
exponentially safer—than the England, or the America, of a century ago. Indeed, guns 
may be the safest and most effective means of protection for hundreds o f thousands, if 
not millions, of Americans each year (Kleck, 1991). While the specific numbers of 
defensive uses of firearms may be in dispute (Duncan, 2000, 1), few deny that hundreds 
of thousands of Americans use personal firearms to protect lives and property each year 
(Waters, 1998).
Violent crime in general plummeted 27 percent between 1993 and 1998. 
Nonfatal violent crime has never been so low since the Justice Department began 
tracking the data in 1973 (Grier, 1999, 4). Homicide rates in the American workplace 
are possibly at an all-time low, with a decline o f 46 percent o f robbery-related 
homicides registered between 1994 and 1998 (Providence Journal, Aug. 5, 1999). The 
homicide rate has recently declined to a mere 6.3 per 100,000, lower than at any time 
since the late 1960s (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000).
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Accidental Violence 
America has become so safe from violence that accidental deaths have increased 
substantially in comparison. 31 percent more Americans died from falling in 1999 than 
in 1992 (Wald, 2000). Poisonings increased by 48 percent in the same period (id.). In 
the same period, 29 percent few er Americans died from firearms accidents (id.). Much 
of this growth in accidental death rates is attributed to an increase in numbers o f elderly 
people prone to falls and drug overdoses (id.).
Interpersonal violence has probably never been so rare in the United States as at 
the dawn of the twenty-first century. Violence in American schools, in American 
homes, and in the American workplace is at or near an all-time low. Although 
homicide rates remain higher in the United States than in other industrialized nations, 
homicide trends appear to be declining sharply from a decade ago.
Popular proclamations and images indicate that violence in America in the year 
2000 is exceedingly prevalent. Violence in schools, violence in the workplace, and 
violence on the roads have taken up an increased proportion of American news 
coverage (Glassner, 1999). Violent crime in modem America is often presented by the 
news media with emotion-laden language (Chiricos, Eschholz, & Gertz, 1997). 
Headlines in major news magazines include “Teen Violence: Wild in the Streets,” 
“Danger in the Safety Zone,” “In a State of Terror,” “Taming the Killers,” and “Florida: 
State o f Rage” (id., p. 342). Three Florida State University professors have described a 
“burst of media coverage” in which television and newspaper stories about violent 
crime increased more than 400 percent during four months in 1993 (id.).
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Nor has the popular press had a monopoly on the characterization of American 
violence as epidemic. Attorney General Janet Reno recently told an audience that “no 
comer o f America is safe from increasing levels of criminal violence” Greenbaum, 
1997, 136). “Parents are afraid to let their children walk to school alone. Children 
hesitate to play in neighborhood playgrounds. The elderly lock themselves in their 
homes, and innocent Americans of all ages find their lives changed by the fear o f 
crime” (id.).
Margaret Mead sparked a romance among westem anthropologists for the noble 
simplicity and passivity of primitive people. Throughout the 1950s to the 1970s, 
anthropologists traversed islands in the South Pacific, joumeyed to remote regions of 
Africa, and explored the interior of South America in search of hunter-gatherer 
societies, producing studies with titles like The Harmless People (Thomas 1959), Never 
in Anger (Briggs 1970), and A Nonviolent People o f  Malaya (Dentan 1979). E. Richard 
Sorenson’s descriptions of the Fore people o f Papua New Guinea (1977) likewise 
described an affectionate, tmsting society in which “sibling rivalry was virtually 
undetectable” until exposure to trade goods, jobs and money brought “[ejpisodes of 
infant and child frustration, not seen in traditional Fore hamlets [along with] repeated 
incidents o f anger, withdrawal, aggressiveness and stinginess.” In the 1980s, however, 
this picture of pre-agrarian man was shattered by the research of anthropologists like 
Richard B. Lee, Bmce M. Knauft, Napoleon Chagnon, and Robert Edgerton and 
sociobiologists like Kanrad Lorenz who found that many of these simple societies 
actually produced homicide rates substantially higher than those found in the West.
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Knauft (1987) found that the otherwise polite and amicable Gebusi people of 
New Guinea had a homicide rate of approximately 683 per 100,000 prior to contact 
with the West in the 1960s. The Yanomamo tribes o f central Venezuela murdered each 
other at a rate o f 165.9 people per hundred thousand annually in the 1970s. Even the 
egalitarian, noncompetitive people of Samoa, of which Margaret Mead wrote so fondly, 
generated homicide rates more than twice as high as those found in the United States 
(Knauft 1987, Table 2).
□ Q j i n  n  D
Figure 1 Homicide Rates (per 100,000 Population) of Selected Societies
The immense discrepancy between the ethnographic observations of 
anthropologists like Mead, Thomas, and Dentan and the quantitative calculations 
offered by Knauft, Lee, and others may do more than call into question the
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methodology o f qualitative research. They may actually mean that rates of homicide 
among simple societies are not accurate measures of overall social violence. If so, this 
discrepancy virtually undermines the notion that homicide rates are a rough overall 
measure of social violence.
Knauft himself (1987) suggested that this discrepancy may be for the most part 
isolated among primitive peoples. “Especially in egalitarian societies, there may be a 
pattern of social life that is generally peaceful and tranquil but is punctuated by 
aggression which, when it does occur, is unrestrained [which] may result in a high ratio 
o f lethal violence to aggression despite a low overall incidence of aggression” (459).
But observations of peace and tranquility accompanied by known high incidences of 
lethal homicide are by no means confined to simple societies. Loutenant Colonel 
George Armstrong Custer noted in his accounts that his heavily armed cavalrymen were 
often polite and courteous with one another, even though their sidearms. U. S. Supreme 
Court Justice Stephen J. Field, who carried a pistol and bowie knife at all times while 
living among the California gold rush, commented that “1 found that a knowledge that 
they were worn generally created a wholesome courtesy of manner and language” 
(Swisher 1963, 66). also commented Historical accounts form westem commentators 
also suggest that homicide may not be an accurate measure of overall violence.
Table 1 illustrates the high level of consistency of national homicide rates over 
time. Although homicide rates fluctuate greatly over time in every nation, they tend to 
remain consistent across the international panel of nations when cross-comparasins are 
made. Thus, the homicide scores o f Venezuela may differ wildly from year to year, but 
remain consistent in relative terms when compared to the other countries on earth.
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Homicide rates recorded for a typical country in 1970 correlate with homicide rates for 
the same country in 2000.
Because homicide data is not measured in accordance with strict standards 
across the international spectrum, various agencies report different numbers for the 
same country in the same year. Some data sets contain only numbers of prosecuted 
murder cases, while others may contain all reports o f homicide to police regardless of 
whether prosecutions were commenced. Table 1 also shows significant relationships 
between these different homicide measurements.
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Table 1. Correlations between international homicide rates, 1970-2000
(significance)
1970
horn
rates
1975
comb.
horn
rates
1975 hom/ 
murder 
rates
1975 hom 
rates
1993/1996 
hom rate
1994
hom
rates
2000
hom
rates
1993/1
996
homici
de
rates
.908**
(.000)**
.359**
(.010)**
.676**
(.000)**
.335*
(.021)*
2**
(.000)**
.961**
(.000)**
.905**
(.000)**
1975 
combin 
ed 
homici 
de rate
.399**
(.005)**
2**
(.000)**
.523**
(.002)**
.969**
(.000)**
.359**
(.010)**
.887**
(.000)**
.608**
(.001)**
1975 
homici 
de rate
.439**
(.007)**
.969**
(.000)**
.559*
(.013)*
2 ** 
(000)**
.335*
(.021)*
.967**
(.000)**
.653**
(.001)**
1994
homici
de
rates
.935**
(.000)**
.887**
(.000)**
.968**
(.000)**
.967**
(.000)**
.961**
(.000)**
2**
(.000)** .992**
(.000)**
2000
homici
de
rates
.650**
(.000)**
.608**
(.001)**
.771**
(.002)**
.653**
(.001)**
.905**
(.000)**
.992**
(.000)** 2**
(.000)**
1970
homici
de/
murder
rates
(.000)**
.399**
(.005)**
.898**
(.000)**
.439**
(.007)**
.908**
(.000)**
.935**
(.000)**
.650**
(.000)**
1975
homici
de/mur
der
rates
.898**
(.000)**
.523**
(.002)**
2**
(.000)**
.559*
(.013)*
.676**
(.000)**
.968**
(.000)**
.771**
(.002)**
** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2- 
* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2
tailed)
tailed)
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CHAPTER 10 
CORRELATIONS
Are high index scores o f market freedom correlated with high homicide rates? 
Figure 2 shows the correlation coefficients obtained when homicide data is analyzed 
against the market-freedom indexes of three different economic research institutions. 
Significant correlations were found between Fraser Institute capitalism rankings from 
1970 and homicide rates in 1975. No such correlation was found, however, between the 
same index scores and either the homicide/murder rate figures for 1970 or 1975.
What is most distressing from the viewpoint of the alienation thesis is the total 
absence of support for the notion that greater capitalism equals higher homicide rates. 
Indeed, the only significant correlations identified in Table 2 below are negative 
correlations. A significant negative correlation was identified between the Fraser scores 
for 1975 and worldwide homicide rates for the same year. This seems to suggest not 
only that the alleged relationship between increasing capitalism and increasing violence 
is untenable or without support, but that it is actually false.
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Table 2. Correlations between economic freedom and homicide rates
Hom/
murder
rates
1970
Horn/
murder
rates
1975
Hom rates 
1975
Hom
rates
1994
Hom
rates
1993/
1996
Hom
rates
2000
Fraser
rankings
1970
-.174
(.253)
-.259
(.285)
-.374*
(.029)*
Fraser
ranking
1975
-.149
(.267)
-.165
(.464)
-.381*
(.014)*
Fraser
index
1975
-.132
(.424)
-.074
(.778)
-.375*
(.014)*
Fraser
index
1990
-.358
(.190)
-.270*
(.031)*
-.137
(.463)
Fraser
index
1995
-.446
(.095)
-.257*
(.029)*
-.393*
(.031)*
Heritage
index
1995
.248
(.413)
.112
(.422)
.244
(.261)
Freedom
House
index
1995
-.290
(.276)
-.190
(.192)
-.138
(.458)
Heritage
index
2004
-.064
(.807)
.136
(.254)
.146
(.394)
* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
What about relationships between noneconomic social variables like fertility rates, birth 
rates and population density? No significant correlations were found between any of 
these variables and homicide rates.
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Table 3 Correlations Between Homicide Rates and 3 Social Indicators
Hom rates 1994 Hom rates 
1993/96^^
Hom rates 2000^ *^
Birthrates 2000 -.131 .188 -.299
(.616) (.117) (.097)
Population density -.131 -.118 -.207
2000 (.616) (.358) (.263)
Fertility rates 2000 .299 .089 .028
(.260) (.460) (.883)
Obvious questions arise regarding the consistency of economic freedom 
measurements by these different economic think tanks. Correlation analysis was run 
with capitalism scores of all three indexes as well as scores registered by the three 
indexes for different years. There is remarkable consistency between these indexes 
across time. Table 4 lays out the extent of the correlations between the three indexes of 
capitalism. Not only do the rival indexes track each other significantly for the same 
years, but they correlate significantly with each other in all years for which data was 
analyzed.
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Table 4. Correlations Between Rival Indexes Of Capitalism
Fraser
rankings
1970
Fraser
index
1975
Fraser
index
1990
Heritage
index
1995
Freedom
House
1995
Fraser
index
1995
Herit
age
index
2004
Fraser
rankings
1970
] ** 
(.000)**
.802**
(.000)**
.772**
(.000)**
-.703**
(.000)**
.545**
(.000)**
.542**
(.000)** .639*
*
(.000
Fraser
rankings
1975
.873**
(.000)**
.963**
(.000)**
.718**
(.000)**
-.557**
(.000)**
.491**
(.000)**
.572**
(.000)** .557*
*
(.000
Fraser
index
1975
.802**
(.000)**
1 ** 
(.000)**
.742**
(.000)**
-.640**
(.000)**
.384**
(.021)*
.560**
(.000)** .489*
*
(.000
Fraser
index
1990
.772**
(.000)**
.742**
(.000)**
2* *
(.000)**
-.734**
(.000)**
.677**
(.000)**
.854**
(.000)** .695*
*
(.000
Heritage
1995
index
-.703**
(.000)**
-.640**
(.000)**
-.734**
(.000)**
2* *
(.000)**
-.810**
(.000)**
-.784**
(.000)**
.831*
*
(.000
Freedom
House
1995
.545**
(.000)**
.384**
(.021)**
.677**
(.000)**
-.810**
(.000)**
2**
(.000)**
.635**
(.000)** .853*
*
(.000
Fraser
Index
1995
.542**
(.000)**
.560**
(.000)**
.854**
(.000)**
-.784**
(.000)**
.635**
(.000)**
2**
(.000)** .683*
*
(.000
Heritage
index
2004
-.639**
(.000)**
-.489**
(.000)**
-.695**
(.000)**
.831**
(.000)**
-.853**
(.000)**
-.683**
(.000)**
1**
(.000
(significance)
** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Regression Analysis 
To determine whether eeonomie freedom is a predictor of homicide rates, 
regression analysis was run with 1975 homieide rates as the dependent variable and the 
Fraser rankings for 1970 and 1975 as the independent variables. To further test the 
strength (if any) o f the relationship, the raw index scores of the Fraser indexes for 1975 
were also analyzed in regression. Again, a predietive relationship resulted, in the 
opposite direetion from the trajectory predicted by the alienation models.
Table 5 Regression, with 1975 homieide rates as the dependent variable. 
(standard error) [significance]
Mean 1975 
homicide rates
Fraser
rankings
1970
-4.369** (.971)
[.002]
Fraser
rankings
1975
9.985** (2.061)
[.001]
Fraser index 
1975
-7.189**
(1.964) [.006]
Fraser Index 
of 48 nations 
(1975)
-3.441*
(1.345)
** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Table 6 shows the results of similar regression analysis when homieide rates for 
the year 2000 are the dependent variable and 2000 fertility rates, 2000 population 
density scores, and the 1995 index scores reported by the Heritage Index, the Freedom
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House Index, and the Fraser Index. The Heritage (WSJ) and Fraser scores were found 
to be significant predictors of homicide rates in the year 2000. Interestingly, neither 
fertility rates nor population density figures were significant predictors.
Table 6 Regression: Pep Variable: Hom Rates 2000 (standard error) [significance]
Significance
Fertility 
rate 2000
.463 (3.239) .889
Population
density
2000
-.014 (.008) .120
Heritage
index
seores 1995
-4.044* (2.049) .074*
Freedom 
House 
scores 1995
.091 (.474) .851
Fraser
index
scores 1995
-2.130* (.965) .049*
* = Regression relationship is significant at the 0.05 evel
Sources: fertility and population data: The Statesman’s Yearbook 2000 (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press)
Similar findings are achieved when eonducting regression analysis on 1995 
Fraser Index scores and homicide rates registered in 1993 and 1996. There is a 
significant negative relationship between the two variables: as levels of market freedom 
go up, homicide rates tend to come down. By inferenee, increasing capitalism is 
significantly linked to greater safety from social violence (espeeially homicide). Table 
7 displays these findings.
107
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 7 Regression With Mid-1990s Homicide Rates 
As the Dependent Variable
B (standard error) Significanee
Fraser Index 
of 73 
countries 
(1995)
-2.887* (1.296) .029*
(standard error)
* = Regression relationship is significant at the 0.05 level
Although this relationship is significant, it by no means translates into a 
smoothness of predictability regarding any individual eountry. Figure 3 below 
illustrates the haphazardness o f this capitalism/homicide relationship during the mid- 
1990s. While some eapitalist eountries like Hong Kong and the Netherlands have very 
low homicide rates, others, like the United States and some of the newly independent 
nations that once made up the Soviet Union, are quite violent.
108
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure 3 Eeonomie Freedom and Homieide Rates, Mid-1990s.
□  Economic Freedom Index Score (1995) 
m Annual Homicides Per 100,000 (1993)
S 2
Findings
The findings from these analyses provide no support for the proposition that 
greater capitalism is equated with growing violenee. In eontrast, there is support for the 
proposition that greater capitalism is linked to decreasing social violence, as measured 
by rates of homicide. Societies with high indexes o f economic freedom also tend to 
report homieide rates below the international mean.
“What is curious, however, is that this concern with violent individuals has all 
too often eelipsed the study of violent authorities” (Archer and Gartner 1984, 64).
Social violence, after all, must include violence by state agents against individuals. And 
a test o f the alienation proposition—the idea that increasing capitalism increases social 
violence—must take violent repression by governments into eonsideration. Here the
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alienation proposition runs up against immediate obstacles. The quest to eliminate and 
repress capitalism has cost more than one hundred million lives since the turn of the 
twentieth century (Rummel 2003).
Oficourse, “[sjerious violence, including homicide, is produced routinely in the 
eourse of law enforcement, eriminal punishment and executions, crowd and riot control, 
political subversion and assassination and, of eourse, war” (Archer and Gartner 1984, 
63).
The Apparent Trend of Underreporting By Socialist Nations 
The quality o f homicide comparisons across nations is undermined by varying 
rates of underreporting by nations. National governments probably never overreport the 
prevalence of homicide within their jurisdictions, but often publish reports that 
understate homicide rates when international studies or record-keeping organizations 
seek data from them. It might even be said that each nation has its own underreporting 
rate. One technique for determining the rate o f underreporting involves the comparison 
of surveys o f crime victims with official crime reports (Archer and Gartner 1984).
It can safely be said, however, that “the degree of undemumeration varies 
inversely with the seriousness o f the offense,” and homicide is underreported at rates 
much lower than other violent offenses. It needs also to be said that socialist nations 
have apparently exhibited a greater proclivity to underreport or decline to report their 
homicide data. Archer and Gartner 1984, 17) note that socialist countries represented 
“exceptions to [the] general pattern of remarkable cooperation” in their study of cross­
national violence from 1970 to 1984. The U.S.S.R. and several other Eastern European
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societies refused to participate in the study and the People’s Republic of China returned 
all requests for erime data unopened (p. 17).
Apparent Trend o f Accelerating Effect 
The trend against violence appears to accelerate in capitalist countries (Payne 
2004, 121). Violent practices went for thousands o f years without mueh change. “Most 
of the progress [against violence] seems to have come in the past two or three 
centuries—that is, since the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions” (Payne 2004, 121).
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CHAPTER 11
HOMICIDE PERCENTAGES IN THE DISTANT PAST
Archaeological revelations have also shattered the illusion o f most Marxists that 
egalitarian simple societies were typified by peaceful coexistence, placid, and tranquil. 
The native American societies o f the U. S. Southwest, the Anasazi, once thought— and 
described in textbooks, musems and National Park Service documents as peaceful and 
nonwarlike—have now been revealed as a violent people whose walled residences were 
designed for combat defense—and who participated in bloody massacres of one another 
long before the arrival of westem capitalism (LeBlanc 2003).
Indeed, this Rousseaun bias has for too long infected archeology itself. 
“Virtually all the basic textbooks on archaeology ignore the prevalence or significanee 
of past warfare, which is usually not discussed until the formation of state-level 
civilizations such as ancient Sumer” (LeBlane 2003, 20). Keeley, the author of War 
Before Civilization (1996), argued that prehistorians “pacified the past,” presuming 
peacefulness even where evidence o f warmaking could not be ignored (LeBlanc 2003, 
21).
But the closer one looks at the record, the more violent it becomes. Prehistoric 
bone armor found in the Arctic; skeletal evidence o f deadly blows to the head among 
ancient Aborigines. LeBlanc (2003, 22) contends that the prehistoric Indians of 
southern California—once though to be peaceful acorn gatherers— exhibited the highest
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incident of warfare deaths ever known in world history or prehistory. Thirty percent of 
males of first century A.D. had wounds or did violent deaths. For women, the rates 
were about half this. “When we remember that not all warfare deaths leave skeletal 
evidence, this is a staggering number” (22).
All well-studied prehistoric farming societies had warfare (LeBlanc 2003, 23). 
Ancient China, Micronesia, etc. were all well-fortified. Defensive walls hundreds of 
miles long were shared by Maya, Inco, Sumerian, and Hawaiin culture (LeBlanc 2003, 
23). “As soon as societies can write, they write about warfare” (LeBlanc 2003, 23).
LeBlanc (2003) describes the proposition that white Westerners spread warfare 
to peaceful people as “a patently false but prevalent notion” (LeBlanc 2003, 23). 
LeBlanc calculated the proportion of foraging and farming societies that died from 
warfare and violence and found “that foragers and farmers have much higher death 
rates—often approaching 25 percent of the men—than more recent complex societies” 
(LeBlanc 2003, 25). Thus, modem capitalistic environs like the contemporary United 
States are much safer than pre-industrial societies. LeBlanc (2003, 25) credits the 
Industrial revolution for bringing homicide rates down, as have others (Lane 1997).
“In a nutshell,” writes Steven Pinker (2002, 56) “Hobbes was right, Rousseau was 
wrong.”
To begin with, the stories of tribes out there somewhere who have 
never heard o f violence turn out to be urban legends. Margaret Mead’s 
descriptions o f peace-loving New Guineans and sexually nonchalant 
Samoans were based on perfunctory research and turned out to be
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almost perversely wrong. As the anthropologist Derek Freeman later 
documented, Samoans may beat or kill their daughters if  they are not 
virgins on their wedding night, a young man who cannot woo a virgin 
may rape one to extort her into eloping, and the family of a cuckolded 
husband may attack and kill the adulterer. The !Kung San of the 
Kalahari Desert had been described by Elizabeth Marshall Thomas as 
“the harmless people” in a book with that title. But as soon as 
anthropologists camped out long enough to accumulate data, they 
discovered that the !Kung San have a murder rate higher than that of 
American inner cities. They learned as well that a group of the San had 
recently avenged a murder by sneaking into the killer’s group and 
executing every man, woman, and child as they slept (Pinker 2002, 56).
Counting societies instead of bodies leads to equally grim figures.
In 1978 the anthropologist Carol Ember calculated that 90 percent of 
hunter-gatherer societies are known to engage in warfare, and 64 
percent wage war at least once every two years. Even the 90 percent 
figure may be an underestimate, because anthropologists often cannot 
study a tribe long enough to measure outbreaks that occur every decade 
or so (Pinker 2002, 57).
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One method o f reconstructing the homicide rates of the anciest past involves 
looking at the archeological record. Human remains sometimes exhibit signs of violent 
death such as broken bones, lacerations, or even imbedded arrowheads. By simply 
counting human specimens that appear to have died violently and comparing their 
numbers to remains dating to the same period, we can draw crude estimates o f the 
prevalence o f violence in a particular period.
Archeology-based methods pose special risks for researchers. It is not always 
easy to tell whether a mummified or preserved corpse died by violence. For this reason, 
homicide rate estimates from archeological sources underestimate homicide prevalences 
to some unknown, but probably substantial, extent.
Moreover, the haphazard placement of archeological finds makes estimates of 
broader prevalences difficult. A site with five murdered corpses found at an ancient 
American quarry, for example, may say very little about the overall homicide rate of 
North America, or even the plains. Thus, even if  such homicides show high rates in a 
given year or decade, their relevance to the homicide rates of an entire century or 
millennia is questionable.
The standard measure o f the prevelance of homicide is murders per 100,000 
members o f a population per year. Computing the statistic requires three separate 
measurements: time period, homicide deaths, and total population. The farther we look 
into the past, the more difficult it is to determine each of these components. Even if the 
population o f a specific city or region during a certain period is known, surrounding 
populations may be quite difficult to determine. In the case of some locales, historic 
population estimates may differ within a range of several multiples. Scholars of North
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American Indian populations before the arrival of Columbus, for example, have offered 
estimates ranging from 1.8 million to 18 million (Mann 2002, 46). Thus, even if  the 
number of homicides among this population were known, estimates o f the homicide rate 
might vary by a factor of ten.
The dimension of time adds further complexity. Because of the difficulty of 
dating archaeological finds with exact precision, we can only attribute a given find to a 
range of years. This problem grows as we look farther back in time. Estimating 
historical homicide rates in this manner is also haphazard because what we know of 
archaeological remains are rarely found through systematic archeological searches. 
Instead, most archaeological discovery comes to us accidentally or through salvage 
excavations (Bahn 1996, 11). For this reason, archaeological samples may not be 
representative of the place or period in question.
At most, we can say only that a known rate o f uncovered remains with signs of 
having died violently has been identified out of a total number o f known uncovered 
remains within a given area dating to a particular range of years. This method of 
determining homicide prevelences is as simple as stumbling across a cemetery filled 
with human corpses and estimating how many died by violence. An overall period of 
interment in the cemetery might establish the temporal element. We might be able to 
say, for example, that a burial ground dating to the 200-year period from 1750 to 1950 
exhibited a crude rate of 1.5 percent violent deaths.
A rival and far less precise method for determining the historic prevalence of 
homicide is to simply find textual summaries of archaeological findings and conduct 
content analysis of them, counting up deaths described as attributable to homicide and
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dividing this tally by the total number of deaths reported in the same source(s). 
Estimating historical homicide rates in this manner is also haphazard because what we 
know of archaeological remains are rarely found through systematic archeological 
searches. Instead, most archaeological discovery comes to us accidentally or through 
salvage excavations (Bahn 1996, 11). For this reason, archaeological samples may not 
be representative of the place or period in question.
Applying this method to one general treatise on archaeological finds yields 
results that are quite surprising. Paul Bahn’s Tombs, Graves & Mummies (1996) 
provides case studies o f “fifty o f the world’s best documented sites o f bodies and 
graves” (Bahn 1996, inside front cover). This compendium of 50 discoveries in world 
archeology, from Lucy, the 3-million-year-old australopithecine found in Ethiopia to 
Zhoukoudian and Java Man, to the killings of Custer and his cavalry at Little Big Horn 
in 1876. Bahn’s sample of fifty sites was selected in accordance to no sampling 
rationale except to show “the incredible variety o f human remains that survive the 
archeological record (11). Bahn notes that a “surprisingly large number of bodies that 
have come down to us with soft tissue intact (p. 10).
Findings
Bahn’s fifty archeaological discoveries yield the remains of something like 
18,670 human beings. O f this number some 4,983, or 26.7 percent, o f the bodies 
exhibit indicia o f violent death, either because they are associated with battlefields, or 
because the corpses show signs of mortal violence, either on the skeleton, on the soft 
tissues, or because of mutilation. When obvious battlefield deaths are removed from
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the total, the proportion who died violently is cut almost in half, to about fourteen 
percent o f total deaths. (Of course this figure underestimates the actual percentage of 
deaths in the sample attributable to homicide because many ancient skeletons and 
bodies of murdered persons exhibit no outward signs of violence).
Fortunately, the percentage o f Americans who die by homicide is known. In 
1991 any randomly selected American had a one in 151 lifetime chance of suffering 
homicide (National Institute o f Justice 1993). "^  ^or 0.66 percent o f all Americans die by 
the hands of others. Thus, homicide in previous centuries (according to a 
nonrepresentative sample of human remains dating to different continents and 
millennia) may have been more than twenty times more prevalent than today.
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CHAPTER 12
THE NOTION THAT CAPITALISM CREATES INEQUALITY 
These findings also beg reconsideration of the oft-repeated catechism that 
capitalist economies generate greater gaps between rich and poor than planned 
economies. Research by former World Bank economist Suijit S. Bhalla illustrates that 
this age-old understanding may be without substantiation. Calculating the world 
distribution o f income at twenty-year intervals, Bhalla found that the world’s poor were 
getting richer faster than the wealthy during the last half of the twentieth century 
(Sanchez 2003). Thus, during a period which almost every scholar describes as one of 
growing capitalism worldwide, the world became dramatically more egalitarian.
Naisbitt’s Megatrends (1984) suggested that growing commercialism is 
achieving the very purposes o f human equality that its most hostile detractors call for. 
Commercialization is breaking up the traditional hierarchies that thrived during the 
centralized, pre-industrial eras o f most Western nations. In place of the old boy 
hierarchies o f the past, wrote Naisbitt, contemporary individuals in modernized 
societies have substituted “the network model o f organization and communication,” 
which is more natural, egalitarian, and spontaneous than the social hierarchies of the 
pre-computer age. Networks formed by like-minded peers restructure the flow of 
power and communication from a vertical to a horizontal power structure.
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According to Naisbitt, the “failure o f hierarchies to solve human problems” has 
been resolved by expanding access to information. This decentralized flow of 
knowledge has had an equalizing effect (1984, 221). “What occurs in a network is that 
members treat one another as peers—because what is important is the information, the 
great equalizer” (1984, 220).
Anticapitalists like Naomi Klein paint the contemporary trend as one in which 
large dominant corporations like WalMart, Mobile, and Nike are playing an increasing 
role. But the data refutes this image resoundingly. Small businesses have exploded in 
relation to big business during the past generation (Norberg 2002). The 30 years 
between 1950 and 1980 saw the rate o f new businesses explode from 93000 per year to 
600,000 per year (Naisbitt 1984, 160). Self-employment has also boomed. Nearly 2/3 
of all new jobs created between 1969 and 1976 were in firms of 20 or less. “During the 
1970s, by contrast, the Fortune 1,000 [corporations] produced virtually no job growth” 
(Naisbitt 1984, 161). This capitalistic altruism stands in contrast to life among 
members o f some primitive societies. “The Siriono Indian of Bolivia eats alone at night 
because, if  he eats by day, a crowd gathers around him to stare in envious hatred. The 
result among the Siriono is that, in reaction to this pervasive pressure, no one will 
voluntarily share food with anybody” (Rothbard 2004b).
Ludwig Von Mises showed that socialists willing to give up significant material 
advantages in the name o f their ideals were a minority (Von Mises 1966, 679). The 
evidence indicates that aquiring property lifts the human spirit, while failure to acquire 
it leaves people depressed. Chronic kleptomaniacs— shoplifters—generally steal to 
treat themselves to a cure for anxiety and depression (Hine 2002).
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Moreover, the implications for human happiness overwhelmingly support the 
conclusion that alienation is the product of centralized socialistic redistribution rather 
than capitalism. Hocutt (2003) argued that the clear weight of human experience 
establishes that people choose economic systems with recognized property rights over 
systems o f centrally-managed property whenever they have the option:
But give people a choice between a country in which they may acquire real 
property and one in which they are precluded from doing so, and soon you 
will see droves of unhappy but hopeful souls leaving the latter to join the 
former, as the dismal history o f the former Soviet Union and its dreary 
satellites confirms. They will be kept in their political prison only with 
barbed wire and armed guards (Hocutt 2003, 179).
Moreover, the picture o f social harmony in primitive societies depicted by the 
alienation theorists is challenged by contemporary insights into daily life in such 
societies. The Inuit, who prize egalitarianism, nonetheless commonly torture animals, 
beat their sled dogs, and kill each other at a very high rate (Edgerton 1992, 79-80). The 
Mbuti, according to noted anthropologist Colin Turnbull (a firm believer in primitive 
peacefulness, incidentally) “kicked [their hunting dogs] mercilessly from the day they 
are bom on the day they die” (101). It seems therefore that man is both self-seeking and 
altruistic; a natural capitalist and a provider of charity to those in need. He seeks 
personal profits but also shares his surplus with others. In one sense, participating in
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free markets is a kind of sharing in that it brings one’s energies and resources to 
members of the community but under terms of personal title and ownership.
In practice, Marxist states have cost the lives of some 100 million human beings, 
many of whom were murdered. In Marxist Cambodia, the death squads murdered every 
literate person. In modem North Korea, some two million persons—approximately ten 
percent o f the country’s population—died between 1996 and 2002 of starvation, 
malnutrition and persecution (Kang 2003). Per capita GDP in neighboring South Korea 
(which was the other half of the same country in 1948) was 13 times the level in North 
Korea in 2002 (Brooke 2003). Nazi Germany’s pogrom against the Jews -though the 
numbers are somewhat disputed—were promulgated to recoup losses perceived to be 
attributable to profiteering Jewish speculators who flew into Germany from London, 
Paris, and New York to buy German assets for pennies on the dollar (Roots 1997). The 
Nuremberg Laws of 1936 were intended to redistribute this Jewish property back to 
Germany.
Writing in 1930, Sigmund Freud predicted this ultimate outcome of the 
communist experiments then taking place around him. “One only wonders,” he 
remarked, “what the Soviets will do after they have wiped out their bourgeois” (Freud 
1961,73). Although he did not live to see the darkest days o f Soviet terror during the 
1950s, his insight into the fundamental paradoxes o f Sovietism proved prescient.
Very few true hunter and gatherer societies exist today. However, the few in- 
depth ethnographies o f hunter-gatherer societies, such as Alin R. Holmberg’s I94I to 
1942 study of the Siriono people o f Bolivia. The Sirione were chronically hungry and 
seemed to care little about one another’s welfare. Constantly quarreling over food, the
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Siriono often hoarded and hit it, refusing to share it with others and ate alone at night or 
in the forest. Women hid food in their vaginas. Sick or elderly persons who could not 
keep up with the nomadic movements of the tribe were abandoned to their deaths.
When offered Western tools or weapons or the opportunity to work as tenant farmers, 
they were eager to accept, “even though they were badly mistreated” (Edgerton 1992, 
14).
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CHAPTER 13 
EXPLANATIONS
If capitalism is linked to decreasing violence instead of increasing violence, how 
then can this be explained? Upon what conceptual basis could a causal relationship be 
stated? In this section, a number of hypothetical explanations are employed to answer 
these questions.
Tilly (2003) suggests that collective violence follows patterns even in all its 
varied forms—barroom brawls, peasant rebellions, labor strikes, ethnic struggles, civil 
wars and even international wars. Tilly concludes that democratic political regimes are 
the best cure for collective violence because they tend to promote broader participation 
and a more extensive array of rights and institutions that distribute social power across a 
greater swath of the social structure.
Another possible explanation is that Max Weber’s conception of human linearity 
(although discredited with regard to his conception o f economic prehistory) accurately 
accounts for the diminishing violence experienced in modem capitalist societies. 
Weber’s theory of rationalism assumes that modem social institutions steadily become 
more efficient over time as individual agents within the institutions (“bureaucrats”) 
develop means to accomplish institutional goals with less and less output of effort and 
resources. This rationalism may explain why individuals interacting with each other 
within highly developed market-based systems of exchange employ violence less and
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less over time: interacting nonviolently is simply more efficient (so long as property 
claims are recognized by all parties).
In the absence of clearly defined property and transaction rights, violence serves 
as a tool for asserting such rights—and a vehicle for enforcing the social contract 
(Jacobs, et al., 2000). One way to visualize this rationalization explanation is to 
examine what violence really accomplishes in human interaction. Violence is employed 
in some cases where property rights are not clear or where parties perceive a void in 
ownership o f property or territory. The use of violence is the most efficient means to 
secure property, territory, or other interests in the absence of clear property rights. 
However, violence is inefficient in many instances, and is certainly a far less certain 
tool than legal protections of property. While it is difficult for some people to view 
contemporary western legal systems as efficient, such systems do provide an avenue for 
parties to make property claims with certainty and predictability. Weber’s theory of 
rationalization may explain why violence appears to decrease as legal protections for 
property and private commercial exchange grow. Looked at in this way, recognition of 
property rights offers a substitute for violence.
Batten (1908), wrote that the history of progress is the gradual diminution of 
waste. “In all the lower stages of life the amount of waste is enormous, and 
comparatively few living creatures ever reach maturity” (Batten 1908, 233). Thus, 
Batten suggested, violent struggle is “Nature’s way of detecting fitness” in primitive 
societies (Batten 1908, 234). Man’s natural progression, accordingly, is toward 
gentility and sociability. In advanced societies, “The fittest in Nature are not by any
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means those who are continually at war with others, but those who aid one another” (p.
Of course, violence and war are likely to occur where groups and individuals 
perceive a likely benefit (Melotti 1985). In societies where prosperity is offered 
through the market, people have fewer incentives to engage in violence to obtain 
prosperity. As Von Mises (1966, 821) stated; “The market economy involves peaceful 
cooperation. It bursts asunder when the citizens turn into warriors and, instead of 
exchanging commodities and services, fight one another.” Humans with foresight 
generally perceive that greater advantages can be derived from cooperation in a market 
economy than from conflict. The “essence of the laissez-faire philosophy,” according 
to Von Mises, is cooperation for the purpose of gaining personal material well-being 
(830). “Under laissez faire peaceful coexistence of a multitude of sovereign nations is 
possible” (824).
Or perhaps the overall material well-being associated with capitalist 
economies— and not capitalism itself—is the true cause of decreased violence among 
free-market societies. The link between economic capitalism and wealth is 
demonstrated by each index. Per capita GDP averages $22,922 (U.S.) among the top 
fifth of nations on the Fraser index, compared to $3,251 (U.S.) among the bottom fifth. 
Economic freedom also correlates with economic growth, meaning that citizens of 
capitalistic countries are components of a growing concern, while citizens of countries 
in the lowest fifth of the Fraser rankings actually witness their nations decline in 
economic power. We can only speculate about the impacts of these trends on the 
prevalence of social violence.
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“O f all the systems of political economy which have shaped our history, none 
has so revolutionized ordinary expectations of human life—lengthened the life span, 
made the elimination of perty and famine thinkable, enlarged the range o f human 
choice— as democratic capitalism” (Novak 1982, 13).“Famine emerges from a lack of 
inter-local trade” and only occurs where anti-market regulations have been imposed 
(Rothbard 2004). Economists note that countries that share strong trade relations 
almost never wage war upon each other (Norberg 2003).
In the wake o f the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the U.S. State Department 
established a “State Failure Task Force” to study the geographic, environmental, 
economic, and historical factors that contribute to violent political and social turmoil 
(Homer-Dixon 298). In essence, the objective was to predict large-scale violence 
before it happened. The Task Force examined two million pieces of data and 600 
variables. “The results were sadly meager,” according to Thomas Homer-Dixon (299). 
“In the end, the findings of the State Failure Task Force said more about the limits of 
contemporary social science, especially political science, than about the reasons states 
fail” (299). “Most important, the task force failed, despite the extraordinary skills and 
resources at its command, to develop a theoretical or statistical approach that could cope 
with the complexity o f human conflict” (300). Only three o f 600 variables—in 
combination—were found to predict future levels of state violence: (1) openness to 
international trade, (2) infant mortality, and (3) a nation’s degree of democracy.
John Naisbitt’s best-selling book Megatrends (1984) suggested that increasing 
efficiency and commercialism is creating greater and more diffused opportunity and 
choice among consumers. Today’s western societies are “Baskin-Robbins” societies.
127
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
where everything comes in 31 [or many more] flavors. Writing in the early 1980s, 
Naisbitt described a U.S. auto market that offered 752 distinct car models to choose 
from, and thousands of choices in light bulbs and cigarettes alone. This “multiple- 
option society” has “spilled over into other important areas of our lives: religion, the 
arts, music, food, entertainment” (260-61). Increasingly diverse living, lifestyle, and 
family arrangements mean that there is no such thing as a conventional family or home 
life. “And like Rubik’s cube, the chance of getting it back to its original state are 
practically nil” (Naisbitt 1984, 261). Today, individuals can “shop” for lifestyles, 
careers and hobbies like never before, accepting or rejecting traditional family or work 
values. “More than ever before people live alone” rather than submit to the desires of 
others (Naisbitt 1984, 261). A multitude of work options, different shifts, part-time 
options and multiple options for working at home or in the field.
The lifestyle empowerment seen in contemporary capitalist societies also 
contributes to an increasing political empowerment. Freer economies lead to wealthier 
people and wealthier people tend to demand political freedoms. “The political notion of 
governance is being completely redefined. Today’s well-informed citizen is capable 
and desirous of participating in political decisions” (Naisbitt 1984, 261).
Limitations
Although the relationship between greater market freedom and lower rates of 
violence appears to be supported by this study, the question of causation leaves the 
parameters o f the relationship in some doubt. Generally, researchers can infer the 
existence of a causal relationship when there is a clear relationship between changes in
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two variables, the allegedly causing variable precedes the caused variable, and all other 
explanations can be eliminated. In the case of the relationship between capitalism and 
violence, there are many other variables and factors that can possibly explain changes in 
both factors.
Payne, however, suggested that declining violence is the cause of greater 
economic freedom and prosperity rather than the effect. “What kind of economy,” he 
asked, “can a community have in the midst o f perpetual civil war?” (2004, 2). “A 
reduced use o f force is obviously a necessary condition for prosperity” (p. 2). And to 
what does Payne attribute the astounding decline in rates of interpersonal violence over 
the centuries? History itself, the steady march of human progress, or linearity. “One is 
almost tempted to answer that ‘History’ is the protagonist in this drama” (p. 27).
There is some evidence that the increasing availability of low-priced consumer 
goods and technology of a widening variety has an equalizing power for the poor and 
disadvantaged. A quarter-century ago, Anthony Smith suggested that increasing print- 
media options were shifting “sovereignty over text” from authors to receivers (1980). 
We now know that Smith drastically understated the egalitarian power o f this trend. 
Sovereignty over media sources has rapidly shifted to the individual, and this trend 
shows no signs of abating. In modem commercial societies, members o f society have 
more media options than they can possibly partake of. Media consumers now have an 
endless supply o f “texts” of their own choices—movies, videos, games, internet 
entertainment as well as print media.
One of the most likely explanations for an inverse relationship between 
capitalism and violence involves the pluralistic nature of sociolegal relations in free-
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market states. The pluralistic model structure orders conduct by restraining individuals 
and resolving disputes between competing individuals and groups (Quinney 1978). 
Under the pluralistic model, no one group holds power indefinitely. Although western 
adversarial legal systems apply a winner-take-all rule, no winner can expect victory in 
every case. Elections d iw y up power between rival sectors o f the electorate.
Finally, there is the conclusion that must be faced: that humanity’s natural state 
may be a capitalistic one, and that man is most at peace when freed to engage in the 
economy without restriction. The evidence supporting this proposition is mounting. 
Twenty centuries o f trial and error with other economic systems have failed to produce 
adequate results. Lester Thurow, in The Future o f Capitalism (1996) concluded that 
“no other economic system other than capitalism has been made to work anywhere” (p. 
1). “Capitalism’s nineteenth-and early twentieth-century competitors— fascism, 
socialism, and communism— are all gone” (p.l).
Lastly and most importantly, if  the alienation proposition, one of the primary 
components in mainstream sociology for more than a century, is without empirical 
support, the implications to sociology, economics, and political science are immense. 
Certainly, the findings of this dissertation study cast great doubt on the alienation thesis, 
and hint that humanity’s “natural state” may be much closer to what Adam Smith and 
Ludwig Von Mises suggested than to a communal or collective state.
130
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CONCLUSION
The findings o f this dissertation study suggest that the thesis that capitalism and 
free markets cause tension, disharmony, conflict, and disruption in the social fabric is 
largely without support empirically. At least when “capitalism” is operationalized by 
means of published index scores by economic think tanks and “violence” is 
operationalized by published homicide rates, there is no provable “alienation” link. On 
the contrary, an analysis of this limited evidence suggests that capitalism may be linked 
with decreasing violence. More research is necessary to determine the precise nature of 
this relationship, and the years ahead will likely provide further data to assist in this 
analysis. However, it can be concluded from this preliminary study that the traditional 
Rousseauan “alienation” proposition is without strong support in the economic and 
homicide data available at the turn of the twenty-first century.
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NOTES
' According to Holmstrom and Smith (2000), capitalism is defined as a “unique social 
relationship” that depended on “two kinds of commodity sellers: on the one hand, a 
class o f capitalists vested with a virtual monopoly of the ownership of the means of 
production and, on the other hand, a propertyless proletariat dispossessed o f the means 
of production and subsistence and, consequently, with nothing to sell but their 
capacity to labor” (Holmstrom and Smith 2000, 2).
 ^Smith’s thesis, often criticized for its simplicity, was that “It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the banker, that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but 
to their self-love, and never take to them of our own necessities but of their 
advantages” (Smith 1776, 20). Thus, self-interest acts as an invisible hand that guides 
products and services to destinations that need them most. “[E]very prudent man in 
every period of society, after the first establishment of the division o f labour,” wrote 
Smith, “must naturally have endeavoured to manage his affairs in such a manner, as to 
have at all times by him, besides the peculiar produce of his own industry, a certain 
quantity of some commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely 
to refuse in exchange for the produce of their industry” (Smith 1991 [1776] 29-30).
 ^Sowell provides the example of Chinese nationals who have left or fled the Chinese 
mainland since the beginning of the twentieth century, often to places like Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, and Australia. While an observer of the Chinese in China during the mid­
twentieth century may have drawn the belief that Chinese are culturally not inclined 
toward capitalism, an observer of Chinese people elsewhere in the world would likely 
draw the opposite opinion. Sowell points out that “Altogether, ethnic Chinese living 
outside China produced as much wealth as China itself in the early 1990s” (1996,
176).
The ethnocentrism with which the founders of sociology viewed world trade history 
can be partially attributed to the dominance of imperial Europe during the period they 
wrote. Marx, Weber, and Durkheim wrote from the comfortable roosts of Western 
industrial preeminence in the late nineteenth century. Looking back to the fifteenth to 
century, these writers saw that Europeans had visited almost every part of the world, 
meeting people weaker than themselves and ultimately conquering them through the
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promotion o f trade advantages (Parry 1965). “The ‘expansion of Europe’ was not, of 
course, deliberately planned, [but] proved irresistible” (Parry 1965, 7).
 ^Interestingly, Freud expressed the view that the alienation theory was “an untenable 
illusion” (1961, 71). Abolishing private property, wrote Freud, would not alter the 
differences in power and influence that nature has introduced— “injustices against 
which there is no remedy” (71 n.7).
 ^Heilbroner (1975, 56n.) cites the years 1202 A.D., and 1494 A.D., as two historians’ 
potential start dates for “capitalism,” referring to the estimations of German economic 
historian Werner Sombart and Oswald Spengler, respectively.
’ There is, o f course, some justification for the view that life is speeding up for many 
of the world’s citizens. At the dawn of the nineteenth century, an average person 
probably met only a few hundred people in a lifetime (Homer-Dixon 2002: 25). 
Almost all information was communicated through speech. Transportation was only 
as fast as a horse or a sailing ship could move. Today, a typical man might meet 
hundreds o f thousands o f people, reach anywhere on the planet within one day, and 
exchange information with other people on the others side of the world instantly by 
gigabyte (Homer-Dixon 2002).
 ^Notably, Sigmund Freud was a skeptic o f the alienation theory. Freud in his 
Civilization and Its Discontents, remarked o f the communist view that 
“Aggressiveness was not created by property. It reigned almost without limit in 
primitive times, when property was still very scanty, and it already shows itself in the 
nursery almost before property has given up its primal, anal form” (71). “As a rule,” 
wrote Freud, man’s “cruel aggressiveness waits for some provocation” to manifest 
itself spontaneously and reveal “man as a savage beast to whom consideration towards 
his own kind is something alien” (69).
 ^Like Marx, Weber’s writings often concentrated on humanity’s economic evolution. 
Weber himself wrote a book-length social and economic history of antiquity entitled 
The Agrarian Sociology o f Ancient Civilizations (1909). Weber’s expertise in 
economic matters was vast. Weber was, in fact, as much a professor of Economics as 
Sociology, and he taught both subjects over the course of his career. His record of 
books, essays, and lectures on économie subjects surpasses his “sociological” 
publications. A man of letters, Weber read and spoke several languages including 
Latin and Greek. Few scholars living at the time of his death in 1920 knew more 
about pre-historic Eurasian political economy.
Weber cited Beloch, who estimated that the annual trade of Piraeus in 401-400 B.C. 
was 2,000 talents (13 million gold franks) based on records of customs duties.
133
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
“Considering that this was in Piraeus alone, that it was soon after the Pelopennesian 
War [and thus in a depressed economy, relatively], that no allowance is made for 
changes in the purchasing power of money, and that even so 2,000 talents is 
approximately the equivalent of one-tenth of the foreign trade o f the present kingdom 
of Greece [2000 years later], this sum is certainly an impressive figure” (Weber 1983, 
34-35).
“Ancient Egypt” cannot be categorized as one scenario, because it thrived for 
several millenia. There is one thing certain, however, the business of Egypt was 
business. And business was profitable. “It has been estimated,” wrote Oliver and 
Page (1970, 37), “that Egyptian peasants of the third millennium B.C. may have been 
able to produce perhaps three times as much as their own domestic requirements.” 
And such great profits inevitably fueled inequality. “A specialist stone-worker might 
now spend a whole year grinding out a single vase in polished porphyry to adorn a 
rich man’s house or to furnish his tomb” (Oliver and Page 1970, 36).
The Egyptian experiment demonstrated the advancements in survivability that had 
been wrought from agriculture and business. One estimate of the Nile Delta estimated 
that the entire valley could only have supported twenty thousand hunter-gatherers; but 
in its commercial prime during its ancient dynasties was probably between three and 
six million (Oliver and Page 1970, 26).
Coram (1987) tested the proposition that a set of norms and values, or a “dominant 
ideology” is necessary for capitalist societies to exist—a common belief underlying 
much social theory (464). He concluded that the proposition is based upon untenable 
underlayments and could not survive scrutiny. Capitalism exists even in the absence 
of a state that supports it (Schlosser 2002).
Isaac Asimov, in his Guide to the Bible (1968) plots the “Eden” o f Genesis as the 
area o f the Tigress and Euphrates Rivers where ancient civilization arose in the fifth 
century B.C. The Bible, according to Asimov, is “a history book covering the first 
four thousand years of human civilization” written from the perspective of the people 
of Canaan, a small section o f Asia bordering the Mediterranean Sea (1968, 9).
Gary North, a Calvinist libertarian who has written approximately 8,000 pages on 
the economics o f the Bible, concludes that that “Mosaic economic law as a whole was 
pro-market, pro-private ownership, pro-foreign trade, pro-money-lending (Deut. 
28:12)” (North 2004). Moreover, writes North, “The New Testament did not break 
with most o f these laws, and the few that it did break with, such as slavery and the 
jubilee land law, made the resulting position even more market favorable.”
If we look only to the Bible as our source for data regarding ancient Eurasian 
civilizations, we must reject the alienation thesis outright. Even if some Biblical
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stories were exaggerated or mythologized, their essence reveals social violence of an 
appalling level (Payne 2004). The Bible describes the ancient near East as a landscape 
of incessant wars, massacres, and homicides. Economically, the region was typified 
by private pursuit o f commercial success in the face of state repression.
Chiricos, Eschholz, and Gertz (1997) surveyed 2,092 adults in Tallahassee, Florida, 
where news coverage o f violent crime has been particularly prominent. They asked 
respondents to rate on a scale of one to ten how much the respondents feared being 
robbed by someone with a gun or knife, being burglarized, and being physically 
attacked. The study found a substantial relationship between exposure to television 
news coverage and fear of crime. Moreover, the frequency o f watching television 
news is “significantly related” to higher fear levels for women, whites and the middle- 
aged.
Research indicates that some substantial portion of the public’s fear of violence and 
crime can be exclusively attributed to news headlines. Only 22 percent of people 
interviewed by one professor cited personal experience as their basis for their fear of 
crime (Glassner, 1999, xxi). The rest (76 percent) cited stories they had seen in the 
media (id.). In the case of drug abuse scares, eight out of ten adults have never 
experienced problems with drug abuse in their family yet nonetheless hold fears about 
drug abuse around them (id.). News panics of a drug abuse epidemic increased by 
more than 400 percent during one six-month period in the late 1980s (Chiricos, 1998,
6oy
C. Everett Koop, United States Surgeon General under President Reagan said 
“[vjiolence is every bit as much a public health issue for me and my successors in this 
century as smallpox, tuberculosis, and syphilis were for my predecessors in the last 
two centuries.” See Introduction to James Gilligan, Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic 
and Its Causes (1996). The June 10, 1992 issue of the Journal o f the American 
Medical Association was devoted entirely to the subject o f violence and included an 
editorial cosigned by Koop entitled “Violence in America: A Public Health 
Emergency.” See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, The American 
Scholar, Winter 1993.
Not all authorities agree that official murder rates reflect actual rates of violence, 
and indeed, there is support for the idea that early figures did not reflect reality.
Conventional wisdom suggests that murders have always been recorded in some 
manner or another. Not so, according to the accounts of some early American 
chronaclers. William Crawford, a British emissary commissioned to undertake a 
systematic study of American criminal justice in the 1830s, concluded that many 
brutal slayings went totally unnoticed “in a legal sense” (Crawford, 26):
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Crimes are of course matters of frequent occurrence, and yet I was informed during 
my stay in America that there was not a single prisoner in the [Illinois] penitentiary 
convicted of any serious offence. The discrepancies between the number of 
commitments and the actual extent o f crime, in the more western as well as the 
southern States, merit peculiar attention. There exists in those parts o f the country a 
great recklessness o f human life. Personal insult is resented by the immediate 
gratification of revenge. A custom prevails of carrying pocket pistols, or of wearing a 
dirk in the bosom, while scarcely any of the labouring classes are without a large 
clasped knife, which, opening with a spring, becomes a truly formidable weapon. 
Hence assaults of the most desperate character in the public streets frequently occur, 
and death to the parties often ensues. Prosecutions, however, arising out of these acts 
of violence, are by no means common (Crawford, 26).
Lane (1997) points out that the earliest national system of quantifying homicides, 
based upon the registration o f death certificates, began only in 1906 and that the 
system was seriously flawed by regional variations in coroner practices (229). The 
earliest attempts at establishing a national homicide rate were made by Professor H.C. 
Brearly in the early 1930s.
As Edgerton wrote, these practices do more than simply impose male dominance 
and can deprive women of important proteins and nutrients. In India, West Africa, 
Morocco, and South America, women women and their children are more vulnerable 
to disease and death form poor nutrition. The Fore of Paua New Guinea, for example, 
are often so deprived of animal flesh that that women supplement their diets by eating 
the flesh of deceased relatives (p. 82). As a consequence, they contract kuru, a 
neurological disease caused often only seen among cannibals (p. 82).
A hybrid data set composed of 1993 United Nations data where available, with 
missing data provided by 1996 rates. United Nations, Global Report on Crime and 
Justice (1999).
Average homicide rates per years 1998 to 2000 from Barclay and Tavares, 
International comparisons of criminal justice statistics 2000 (2002).
In contrast, the average American in 1991 had a one in 38 chance o f dying by 
accident and a one in four chance of dying from heart disease (National Institute of 
Justice 1993).
Note that laws on the books throughout the history o f the United States prohibited 
government officials from acting in bad faith when negotiating real estate transactions 
with Native Americans. Congress’ Northwest Ordinance of 1787 proclaimed:
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The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians; their land and 
property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, 
rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful 
wars authorized by Congress, but laws founded injustice and humanity shall from 
time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them (Northwest 
Ordinance, 1787, Third Article, as found in Prucha 1990).
President Theodore Roosevelt, who had experiences in the frontier West as a young 
man, scoffed at claims that the Plains Indians held the lands they roamed upon in the 
manner of owners. Writing in the 1880s:
To recognize the Indian ownership o f the limitless prairies and forests of this 
continent—that is, to consider the dozen squalid savages who hunted at long intervals 
over a territory of a thousand square miles as owning it outright, necessarily implies a 
similar recognition of the claims o f every white hunter, squatter, horse thief, or 
wandering cattleman. (Jamieson 1996, 32).
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